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Each Article in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has its
unique grammar, and, whenever coverage overlaps, translation has
proven difficult. Some of the most useful work in commercial law
scholarship tries to reconcile the separate gram.mars in the areas of
overlapping coverage. The collision between Article 6 (bulk sales)
and Article 9 (security interests in personal property) is the subject
of a particularly strong essay by Steven L. Harris,1 who has ex1. Harris, The Interaction of Articles 6 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Study in Conveyancing, Priorities, and Code Interpretation, 39 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1986).

Although my comments will often tend to a critical mode, I wish to state that Harris's arti
cle is excellent commercial law scholarship indeed. His article is brimming with cleverness
and insight. Many times I found myself initially disagreeing with a proposition, only to be
won over by Professor Harris's careful argumentation. Countless times Harris's article has
saved me from making mistakes in the analysis that is about to proceed.
However, having been invited to join this symposium in order to write on the same
subject as Professor Harris, I can't just agree with him on each and every issue, can I? It is
incumbent upon me to find some .things to disagree with. Accordingly, my essay tends to
magnify the tiny areas of disagreement and may give the wrong impression about Harris's

\
\
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haustively analyzed every problem that might arise in priority
disputes between the secured creditors of bulk sellers and bulk
buyers2 (together with their various transferees). Professor Harris's
findings on these priority contests are summarized in Figure One:
work. In an effort to counteract this impression, whenever I have set forth a conceptual idea
that was developed first in Harris's article, I have endeavored to give his article credit in the
footnotes. Undoubtedly, I have not done this enough. There are very few stones left un
turned by Professor Harris's treatment of this subject.
2. One isn't supposed to use the phrase "bulk buyers" under the UCC. One has to say
«bulk transferee." U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1987) (" 'Buying'. . . does not include a transfer in
bulk"). The new Article 6 would change this. It refers generally to buyers and sellers. See
U.C.C. Article 6 (1988). This new Article 6 fails to amend UCC section 1-201(9), so that
buying still does not include a transfer in bulk, even while Article 6 refers to "buyers" in
bulk. The new Act also fails to amend the references to "transferee in bulk" that appear in
section 9-301(1)(c) and section 9-301(2). In the spirit of the revisions, and because I don't
see how it matters much, I will refer to "buyers" or "transferees" in bulk indiscriminately.
Incidentally, some courts have found that the exclusion of bulk transferees from the
definition of "buyer" has substantive significance. Thus, where bulk transferees claim to
have taken free of inventory security interests under UCC section 9-307(1), courts have said
that bulk transferees are not buyers and therefore are not entitled to the protection of sec
tion 9-307(1). E.g., Bank of.the West v. Commercial Credit Fin. Servs., Inc., 852 F.2d 1162,
1169-70 n.6 (9th Cir. 1988). These courts could also have said that bulk transferees. are
buyers, but not buyers in tlie ordinary course of business. Such reasoning also would have
disqualified the use of section 9-307(1) by bulk transferees.
I am compelled to admit, however, that there is one substantive difference caused by
excluding bulk transferees from the concept of buyer. This difference is felt with regard to
the priority of discretionary future advances.
Suppose S and SP1 agree that certain collateral will serve as collateral for any discre
tionary advance SP1 may choose to give. If S has sold the collateral to B (out of the ordinary
course of business) and if SP1 is senior to B, SP1 may give senior advances-i.e., advances
that encumber B's newly bought property-until SP1 learns of the sale. This privilege runs
out after forty-five days, however. That is, the privilege has a maximum life of forty-five
days. U.C.C. § 9-307(3) (1987).
Suppose, though, thatB is a bulk transferee. According to section 1-201.(9), "'[b]uying'
... does not include a transfer in bulk." If taken literally, SP1 does not have the forty-five
day privilege described in section 9-307(3). What then is the status of SPi's discretionary
future advances?
One answer would take this definition of "buyer" seriously and would play upon the
fact that the forty-five day privilege was added in the 1972 amendments to the UCC. Ac
cordingly, one should apply whatever privilege existed before 1972 to bulk transferees.
Unfortunately; the status of the future advance prior to 1972 was opaque. One group said
that discretionary advances simply expanded the old security interest and did not create a
new one. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY§ 35.6 at 937-38 (1965)
(asserting that no difference exists between a nondiscretionary future advance and a discre
tionary one). Another thought each new discretionary advance created a new security
interest with a different priority from the ones associated with other advances. Coogan &
Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon Receivables Financing-Some
Answers and Some Unresolved Problems, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1529, 1549-51 (1963) (in case of
a discretionary future advance, attachment is deferred). One major clue that existed as of
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Bulk Sales:
Complying Buyer

Noncomplying Buyer

Security interest
granted by seller:
Perfected

Unperfected

Secured party
wins

Secured party
wins

Buyer wins if no
knowledge of security interest

Secured party wins
whether or not the
buyer has knowledge of the earlier security interest

Figure One

1962 appeared in the old fixture priority section. Under the 1962 version of section 9313(4)(c), discretionary future advances under real estate mortgages had separate priorities.
U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(c) (1962). Similarly, the 1962 version of the accession section (still in effect) also applies different priorities to each discretionary future advance. U.C.C. § 9-314(3)
(1987). Therefore, if these provisions are evidence of the true pre-1972 rule, and if we apply
them to bulk transferees, SP1 may give no future advances after a bulk sale-at least when
the purchaser complies with the rules of Article 6. This seems fair. Article 6 compliance
implies that SP1 has received full notice and therefore will know not to give any future
discretionary advances on the strength of B's collateral. See infra text accompanying notes
55-60. This puts bulk buyers and other buyers on exactly the same footing-both are free of
discretionary future advances once the secured party knows the transfer has occurred.
A separate answer simply ignores the definition of "buyer" in section 1-201(9) and applies the rule of section 9-307(3) to bulk transferees. This is justified by the fact that the
newly revised version of Article 6 uses the word "bulk buyer," in spite of section 1-201(9). In
addition, the definition of "buying" quoted above appears in a section that commences with
the definition "buyer in the ordinary course of business." It should be possible to argue that
the definition of "buyer" that excludes bulk transferees is effective only with regard to the
phrase "buyer in the ordinary course of business." This would allow us to maintain that
bulk transferees can be buyers out of the ordinary course of business. On the other hand,
this latter point-ignoring section 1-201(9)-must in turn ignore the fact that, in section 9301(1)(c), buyers out of the ordinary course of business and bulk transferees are treated as
mutually exclusive categories.
Bulk transferees are not the only fly in the ointment with regard to discretionary future
advances. According to section 9-307(3), only buyers out of the ordinary course of business
are subject to the forty-five day rule. Buyers in the ordinary course of business are immune
from this privilege-or are subject to the pre-1972 rules, whatever they may be. The drafters
of the 1972 amendments thought that this posed no problem because buyers in the ordinary
course of business take .free of future advances-and free of any perfected security inter-
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Figure One represents a legal system that Harris would prefer.
Unfortunately, the doctrinal materials are in rebellion in each and
every one of the four quadrants presented. 3
Let us quickly review this Cartesian domain. In the northwest
quadrant, a perfected secured party faces a complying buyer. Professor Harris takes the position that the security interest should
survive the bulk sale, a position for which he has strong statutory
support.-' Yet, a recent opinion from the Fifth Circuit states that a
buyer who complies with Article 6 takes free of all earlier perfected
security interests. In National Bank of Texas v. West Texas
Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee)/' a noncomplying buyer took
inventory encumbered by perfected security interests. The court
held that the perfected security interests had priority over the
noncomplying bulk buyer· (although only for six months!). 6 The
Fifth Circuit's comments about a complying buyer therefore can be
contemned as mere dictum. Professor Harris, in his article, spends
a great deal of time pulverizing this dictum. Perversely, I will defend McBee as better commercial law than Professor Harris would
give credit for. I will claim that the McBee case protects secured
parties adequately well and responds to an unfortunate "double recovery" effect that the "proceeds" provision of Article 9 has.
The southwestern quadrant of Figure One should have been a
placid desert. If a complying buyer has no knowledge of an earlier
unperfected security interest, then the complying buyer should
win. 7 Not so according to the Second Circuit in Aircraft Trading &
est-under section 9°307(1). See U.C.C. § 9-307 comment 4 (1987). They overlooked the fact
that section 9-307(1) destroys only the security interests created by the seller. Thus, if S
issues a security interest on inventory to SP1 and S then sells to a buyer in the ordinary
course of business, then clearly these buyers are free from discretionary future advances.
But what if S makes a bulk sale to B, and B sells to B 2 in the ordinary course of her
business? Now section 9-307(1) fails to kill SP1's security interest. Furthermore, section 9307(3) does not govern; and so we must find some other future advance rule.
3. Of course, Harris recognizes this and therefore criticizes the contrary doctrine, except that in the southwest quadrant some contrary case law postdates Harris's essay. See
infra text accompanying notes 67-75.
4. u.c.c. § 9-306(2) (1987),
5. 714 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1983), reversing 20 Bankr. 361 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1982).
6. See McBee, 714 F.2d at 1327-30. This part of McBee is criticized infra in the text
accompanying notes 245-56.
7. U.C.C. § 9-30l(l)(c) (1987) ("[A]n unperfected security interest is subordinate to
the rights of ... a person ... who is a transferee in bulk ... to the extent that he gives value
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Services, Inc. v. Braniff, Inc. 8 In this case, a debtor sold collateral
to a buyer with no knowledge of the unperfected security interest.
Later, the secured party did perfect. When the buyer sold to a subsequent buyer, the secured party now had priority:
This case is undeniably bad commercial law. Every commercial law scholar knows of opinions like this, in which judges,
unfamiliar with the .arcane grammar of commercial law, make a
complete incoherent mess of the case before them. It is my belief
that commercial law is subject to an implicit paradigm which case
law must honor. If case law is within this paradigm, the precedent
is honored and subsumed. If bad cases fall outside of the paradigm, then they become alms for oblivioJ?.,9 subject to a grand
unspoken conspiracy whereby the precedent is simply forgotten.
Indeed, articles like this one are positive dangers in this process,
because, by discussing bad cases, it becomes more difficult to pull
off the process of forgetting. In other words, if a commercial law
opinion is a disaster, for heaven's sake don't write a law review
article about it! Rather, let the natural process of forgetting take
its course. Hence, this Article is built on a certain contradiction,
being both dedicated and indifferent to high quality commercial
law.
In the northeast quadrant of Figure One, a perfected secured
party faces a noncomplying buyer. To put it another way, the hero
of Article 9 faces the villain of Article 6. Predictably, the hero loses
and the villain wins, at least in the long-term, in that the hero is
given a very short statute of limitations. According to the pesky
McBee court, the six-month statute of limitations in Article 610 applies to perfected security interests. 11 On the other hand, if the
secured party does beat the short statute of limitations, the same
case holds that the secured party not only gets the inventory actually transferred in the bulk sale, but a bonus-any inventory the
and receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest and before
it is perfected.").
8. 819 F.2d 1227, 1235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (9187).
9. "Time hath, my lord, a wallet at hi_s back, Wherein he puts alms for oblivion, A
great-siz'd monster of ingratitudes." W. Shakespeare, THE HISTORY OF TROILUS AND CRESSIDA, Act III, scene 3, lines 145-47.
10. See U.C.C. § 6-111 (1987).
11. National Bank of Texas v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re, McBee), 714
F.2d 1316, 1328 (5th Cir. 1983).
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noncomplying buyer acquires thereafter. 12 Or, in other words, the
buyer becomes liable on the seller's after-acquired property clause,
even though the buyer did not expressly agree to be liable.
The southeast quadrant in Figure One contains the only genuine analytical puzzle. In this .quadrant, neither the bulk buyer nor
the secured party has fulfilled the obligations imposed by Article 6
and Article 9. Even here, we can be confident that, where the noncomplying buyer knows of the earlier unperfected security interest,
the unperfected secured party clearly has priority13-at_ least for
six months. 14 But. if the noncomplying buyer is in good faith in all
respects except for complying with the rules of Article 6-'-that is, if
she is a noncomplying buyer without knowledge of the earlier unperfected sec1.1rity interest-,-the proper priority is difficult to
fathom, because neither the unperfected secured party nor the Article 6 noncomplying buyer has done what the la..w demands . As to
this priority puzzle, I will take issue with Profe,ssor Harris's solu~
tion. He would say that the .buyer destroys the unperfected
security interest under Article 9, 15 but Article 6 resuscitates the
dead security interest and saves the secured party. 16 I will attempt
to show that this solution is founded upon a contradiction. Instead,
if the unperfected secured party is to win out, it must be on a theory Harris expHcitly rejects (but implicitly accepts). The theory
must be that bulk buyer who fails to comply with Article 6 is not
a bulk buyer at all, within the meaning of Article 9.
· These quadrants represent the four categories of possible priority disputes. We now proceed through them, one at a time.
·

a

12. Id .. at 1331.
13. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c) (1987). Later, we will see that some authorities insist that
bulk transferees who fail to comply with Article 6 are not bulk transferees at all, for the
purposes of section 9-301(1)(c). See infra text accompanying notes 267-289. If this principle
is followed, then section 9-301(l)(c) cannot establish the priorities. Some .other principle
must be found. According to this other principle, the bulk transferee always loses to an
unperfected secured party, whether knowledgeable or not of the existence of any security
interest. This result is dictated by the residual rule in section 9-201, which provides that
secured parties always win unless some specific provision of the UCC says otherwise. See
U.C.C. § 9-201 (1987). If a would-be bulk transferee cannot use section 9-301(1)(c) because
she is not really a bulk transferee by virtue of having failed to comply with Article 6, then
no other provision gives her priority either. Accordingly, the unperfected secured party always has priority.
14. The short statute of limitations is the dubious conclusion of the McBee court. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1328.
15. Harris, supra note 1, at 205.
16. Id. at 208.
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THE PERFECTED SECURED PARTY AND THE COMPLYING BUYER

In the northwest quadrant of Figure One, a secured party has
a perfected security interest in inventory. Thereafter, the debtor
sells the inventory to a buyer in a bulk sale. Under Article 9, buyers and any sub-transferees take subject to perfected security
interests, unless the secured party authorizes the sale (i.e., waives
the security interest). 17 The only chance, then, for showing that
bulk sales terminate perfected security interests (when the buyer
has complied with the require~ents of Article 6) depends on
whether secured parties authorize such sales simply by virtue of
acquiescing and letting the sale proceed without protest. 18
Professor Harris thinks this case cannot be made. According
to Harris, Article 6 puts only burdens on bulk buyers. 19 If Article 6
were to allow a complying bulk buyer to take free of a perfected
security interest, it would be affirmatively rewarding buyer compliance by giving the buyer more than she would have had as a
regular buyer.

A.

The McBee Case

Harris asserts these views in the course of criticizing Judge
Jerre Williams's bacchantic opinion in Nati'onal Bank of Texas v.
West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re ·McBee). 20 In this case, a
noncomplying buyer bought already encumbered inventory from a
seller. Subsequently, the buyer granted a security interest in the
inventory to her own lender, so that we had the situation
presented in Figure Two:
17. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1987) ("Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security
interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale ...."). There are exceptions to this
rule. Buyers of inventory in the ordinary course of business, buyers of consumer goods
(where perfection is not by filing), and any buyer against whom a security interest for a
future advance is claimed can each take free of the relevant perfected security interest.
U.C.C. § 9-307 (1987). Also, a security interest dies if the secured party waives it. U.C.C. §
9-306(2) (1987). Whether this occurs when a bulk buyer complies with Article 6 is discussed
infra in the text accompanying notes 47-64.
18. For a discussion of implied authority cases, see R. HILLMAN, J. McDONNELL & S.
NICKLES, COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 22.02[1l(b]
(1985 & Supp. 1986).
19. Harris, supra note 1, at 201.
20. 714 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1983).
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In McBee, Judge Williams, writing for the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, decided that the perfected security interests of SP1 (an
inventory lender) 21 and SP2 (a purchase money lender on inven21. McBee presents a series of puzzles, particularly with regard to the relation of SP1
and SP2, not all of which are precisely relevant here. But since we will return to the facts of
McBee frequently, I want to take some time to set forth some of the facts.
The case commences with the bulk seller (Colley, whom I shall call S) as the sole proprietor of the Oak Hill Gun Shop. S wishes to obtain a loan from SP1 (National Bank of
Texas), but instead of doing so personally, S was represented by Cynthia McBee, who would
eventually be the noncomplying bulk buyer (and whom I will designate as B). B incorrectly
represented to SP1 that she and S were partners; As a result, B signed the security agreement; S never did. Now it must have been the case that B was the agent of S with power to
bind him. Therefore, as a result of the loan, both B and S were personally liable on the loan
agreement. See TEx. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b § 16 (Vernon 1968) ("When a person
... represents himself . . . or consents to another representing him to anyone, as a partner
... he is liable to any such person to whom such representation has been made."). This loan
agreement also granted to SP1 a security interest in all present or after-acquired inventory
of the "partners."
SP1 filed a financing statement under the name "Oak Hill Gun Shop." If Sand B had
really been partners, this would have been the proper thing to do. But, according to UCC
section 9-402(7), "A financing statement sufficiently shows the name of the debtor if it gives
the individual, partnership or corporate name of the debtor, whether or not it adds other
trade names or names of partners." U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1987). Bankruptcy Judge Elliott read
this provision to mean that SP1 had to file under the names of the individuals to whom it
had lent. It could not use their trade names. Hence, according to Judge Elliott, SP1 was
unperfected. SP1 tried unsuccessfully to claim that Band SP1 were "partners by estoppel,"
and that, therefore, filing under the name "Oak Hill Gun Shop" was appropriate. This argument does not follow, however. Just because SP1 was entitled to rely on B's representation
of partnership does not mean that third parties would be bound by this, as the court of
appeals recognized. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1322-23 (misleading trade name filing insufficient to
beat hypothetical judicial lien creditor, even on a theory of partnership by estoppel).
Apparently worried that this "partnership by estoppel" argument would allow SP 1 to
perfect by filing under the trade name of S, Judge Elliott chose to rule simply that there
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tory who also claimed after-acquired inventory and accounts
receivable) survived the sale and hence both had priority22 over B
was no "partnership by estoppel" because evidence did not "preponderate in its favor." In
re McBee, 20 Bankr. 361, 363 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1982). This holding did not leave Judge
Elliott with a theory as to how SP1's security interest might attach to S's inventory.
When the Fifth Circuit reversed and found that SP1 did perfect after all, then a theory
was needed as to how S could be bound on an agreement he did not sign. Therefore, some
sort of agency-principal relationship must have existed between B and S. Partnership by
estoppel seems as good a way to put it as any. See K.N.C. Wholesale, Inc. v. AWMCO, Inc.,
56 Cal. App. 3d 315, 319-320, 128 Cal. Rptr. 345, 348 (1976) ("[A] debtor who does not own
collateral may nonetheless use the collateral for security, thereby obtaining 'rights in the
collateral,' when authorized to do so by the actual owner of the collateral."); Bank of the
West v. Commercial Credit Fin. Servs., Inc., 655 F. Supp. 807, 813 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd on
other grounds, 852 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1988) (even if bulk seller was never the owner of the
assets, it had authority from the real owner to create a security interest in the assets).
In any case, the Fifth Circuit reversed and ruled that SP1 had successfully perfected.
Judge Williams read section 9-402(7) as saying only this: if you file under the name of an
individual partnership or corporation, then you need not also list the trade name. Judge
Williams did not read this provision as preventing filing under a trade name in lieu of other
names. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1321-22. Instead, he thought that you could file under a trade
name if not misleading. See U.C.C. § 9-402(8) ("A financing statement substantially complying with the requirements of this section is effective even though it contains minor errors
which are not seriously misleading."). To reach such a conclusion, Judge Williams had to
overcome this official comment:
In the case of individuals, [section 9-402(7)] contemplates filing only in the individual
name, not in a trade name. In the case of partnerships it contemplates filing in the
partnership name, not in the names of any of the partners, and not in any other trade
names. Trade names are deemed to be too uncertain and too likely not to be known
to the secured party or person searching the record, to form the basis for a filing
system.
U.C.C. § 9-402 comment 7 (1987). Judge Williams had no problem avoiding this formidable
obstacle. He thought "this comment enunciates the general rule that ... filing under a trade
name is insufficient. This principle, however, cannot be applied blindly without reference to
the overriding purpose it seeks to serve." McBee, 714 F.2d at 1323; Thus, according to Judge
Williams, when trade names are certain, you can file under them. Accord Brushwood v.
Citizens Bank of Perry, 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1981). This was especially true because S and
B, in the bulk sale, had signed an agreement that provided that S is to sell "any partnership
interest" to R Hence, B's creditors would have looked under what they took to be the partnership name, "Oak Hill Gun Shop,'' and would have found SP1's financing statement.
22. SP2 , a trade creditor, took a purchase money security interest on the inventory
supplied, plus a security interest in other existing and after-acquired inventory and accounts
receivable. Bankruptcy Judge Elliott ruled (with some justification) that SP1 was unperfected and hence SP 2 had priority. See McBee, 20 Bankr. at 363; supra note 2LWhen
SP1 was saved on appeal, an issue might have arisen concerning the comparative priority of
SP1 and SP2• To the extent that SP2 could still trace its purchase money collateral, SP2
should have had priority as to these items of collateral. This was simply ignored because,
according to Judge Williams, SP2 "does not assert such priority. It concedes that it took its
security interest subject to [SP1 's] prior interest and should have second priority." McBee,
714 F.2d at 1325 n.9. One hopes that the collateral was adequate to cover the claims of both
SP1 and SP2 , so that it would be unnecessary to figure out which of the two had priority; or
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and hence over SP3's security interest as well. 23 But in the course
of ruling that SP1 and SP2 had priority, Judge Williams set forth a
controversial view of how Article 6 works. According to Williams, if
the buyer had complied with the rules of Article 6, then the perfected security interests of SP1 and SP2 would have been
destroyed, and the buyer would have owned the collateral free and
clear. 24
Here is the way Judge Williams sees it:
In the absence of a bulk sales law, creditors generally would lose all
security interests in collateral once transferred to a new owner; the
secured creditor's recourse would lie against the debtor-transferor,
including an interest in any proceeds received by the transferor from
the bulk sale. 211

This assessment of what the law would look like in the absence of
Article 6 is roughly correct as to unsecured creditors, 26 but not correct with regard to secured creditors. 27 At least when inventory is
sold within the ordinary course of business, a perfected security
that SP2 could not have traced the purchase money collateral (in which case the commingling rules might have helped SP2; see infra text accompanying notes 214-33). If neither of
these things is true, then the lawyers for SP2 miscalculated by making such an admission.
23. It actually went further and said that SP1's security interest covered not only the
inventory conveyed by the seller to the buyer but subsequent inventory the buyer acquired
after the sale. This aspect of the opinion is criticized by Harris, supra note 1, at 232, and ·
will be more or less defended infra in the text accompanying notes 113-22.
24. Initially, the lawyers for SP1 and SP2 missed the Article 6 issue altogether. Bankruptcy Judge Elliott added it on the basis of allegations by SP1 and SP2 that they were not
notified of the sale. In re McBee, 20 Bankr. at 364. Thereafter, McBee became primarily an
Article 6 case.
25. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1327 (footnotes omitted).
26. General creditors have in rem rights against B under fraudulent conveyanee law,
so that, even as to them, Judge Williams is misdescribing the significance of bulk sales law
(unless he views fraudulent conveyance law as subsumed in bulk sales law).
27. Judge Williams's idea that Article 6 compliance allows a bulk buyer to be senior to
prior perfected security interests comes from a misreading of the best-selling commercial
treatise by James J. White and Robert Summers, who write, "In the absence of a bulk sales
law a transferor's creditors are generally not entitled to levy or the like on assets the transferor has sold to a new owner." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 768 (2d ed. 1980). As Steven Harris shows, White and Summers
meant only general creditors in this passage, not secured parties under Ar.tide 9. Harris,
supra note 1, at 197.
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interest will survive the sale. 28 Be that as it may, Judge Williams
explains the effect of Article 6 as follows:
Article 6 of the U.C.C., as adopted by Texas, changes the relative
position of the parties affected by a bulk sale. . . . Article 6 places
certain requirements upon the parties to the bulk sale. These requirements serve to notify the transferor's creditors of the intended
sale, thus permitting the creditors to protect their security interests
before the transfer. They also protect the transferee and his subsequent creditors by bringing to light and terminating all prior
security claims to the transferred property.
Had Article 6 been complied with, [SP1 and SP2 ] would have
retained no interest in the gun shop in McBee's hands. 29

Professor Harris finds this point of view egregiously wrong. 30 Nevertheless, a little something might be said on behalf of the McBee
dictum quoted above.

B. Implications of the Strong Version of Article 6
Texas is among the minority of jurisdictions that has adopted
the "strong" version of Article 6. In the strong version, the buyer
in bulk has the responsibility to retain the proceeds for the creditors of the seller. Thus, in Texas:
Upon every bulk transfer subject to this chapter for which new consideration becomes payable ... it is. the duty of the transferee to
assure that such consideration is applied so far as necessary to pay
those debts of the transferor which are either shown on the list furnished· by the transferor (Section 6.104) or filed in writing in the
place stated in the notice (Section 6.107) within thirty days after the
mailing of such notice. 31

This provision implies that the transferee must keep control of the
funds until the creditors are paid. And since these funds are cash
proceeds belonging to the perfected secured party, they should be
28. "Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale ... unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party .
. . ." u.c.c. § 9-306(2) (1987).
29. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1327-28 (emphasis added in part).
30. Harris, supra note 1, at 196-201.
31. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.§ 6.106 (Vernon 1968). The place of filing referred to
in this provision can be any place designated in the notice sent to creditors. See U.C.C. § 6107(2)(b) (1987).
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used to pay down the secured debt, thereby guaranteeing that the
security interest is retired. This is what the McBee court may have
meant when it thought that Article 6 compliance resulted in the
termination of perfected Article 9 security interests.
The McBee view might be defended as asserting the following
maxim: a secured party should have a property right to cash proceeds if the security interest has been destroyed in a "free and
clear" sale to some transferee. Otherwise, if the sale is made subject to the security interest, the secured party should have no right
to cash proceeds. 32
Under Article 9, the secured party gets a double entitlement of
sorts-a continuing security interest and cash proceeds. 33 Suppose
collateral is worth $100, and the secured party claims $50. In such
a case, a rational buyer with knowledge of the security interest
would pay the debtor $50 for her equity. A reasonable person could
argue that, if the collateral is still available to the secured party,
the secured party should have no claim against the $50 the debtor
received. But Article 9 does allow the secured party to have both a
continuing security interest (for $50) on the collateral and a right
to the $50 cash proceeds a buyer is likely to pay in. 34 Thus, before
the sale, the secured party had $100 in collateral. After the sale,
the secured party has $150 in collateral. Now if the $50 in cash is
freely available to the secured party, there is no reason to also allow the secured party to go after the buyer's property. McBee can
be seen as a rebellion against this situation under Article 9. That
is, since (the strong version of) Article 6 requires the bulk buyer to
hold the cash proceeds for the secured party, the secured party
should receive cash proceeds only, and not a surviving security
interest.
Several objections to this defense of ~McBee might be offered.
First, the Article 9 idea of giving the secured party a "two-for-one"
interest in cash proceeds as well as in the original collateral might
be defended because it coerces the debtor and the buyer to seek
32. See generally Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment of Liens on After-Acquired
Property, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 505, 510 n.29 (1985) [hereinafter Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment]; Carlson, Death and Subordination Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 547, 566 (1984) [hereinafter Carlson, Death and Subordination].
33. See Bank of the West v. Commercial Credit Fin. Servs., Inc., 655 F. Supp. 807, 819
n.8 (N.D. CaL 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 852 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1988) ..
34. u.c.c. § 9-306(2) (1987).
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out the secured party's authorization of the sale. This gives the
secured party a chance to insist that the cash proceeds be turned
over directly to the secured party, so that the buyer takes free of
the security interest, pays the full unencumbered value of the collateral, and pays off the secured party's claim to the extent of the
collateral's value. But, significantly, this is precisely the result that
the McBee dictum produces. That is, the strong version of Article
6 requires that the cash proceeds be turned over to the secured
party directly. Hence, a deep inquiry into proceeds theory of Article 9 helps to rehabilitate the vision offered by Judge Williams in
McBee.
A second criticism of the idea that Article 6 compliance destroys perfected security interests-at least where the strong
version of Article 6 is in effect-is that creditors have a pro rata
right to the cash proceeds if they are insufficient to pay all the
creditors. Section 6-106(3) provides, "If the consideration payable
is not enough to pay all of the said debts in full distribution shall
be made pro rata. " 35 This might be taken to imply that a secured
party should share pro rata with the general creditors. If this were
right, then section 6-106(3) poses a serious obstacle ~o the idea
that a complying bulk transfer terminates perfected security
interests.
Such a reading of section 6-106(3) can be avoided, and many
courts have done so. 36 Article 9 awards cash proceeds to the secured party over the general creditors, so that section 6-106(3)
provides pro rata sharing among general creditors only after the
owner of the .cash, the secured party, is paid out to her full entitlement.37 Details of this theory might work like this. Where only
35. Id. § 6-106(3).
36. E.g., In re Figearo, 79 Bankr. 914, 918 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987) (a perfected security
interest in the inventory of a business attaches to proceeds recovered by a trustee in bankruptcy as a result of the compromise of fraudulent conveyance litigation); Mid-American
Indus., Inc. v. Ketchie, 767 P.2d 416, 420 (Okla. 1989) ("Article 6 neither impairs a valid
article 9 security interest nor does it affect article 9 remedies. It does not require that secured and unsecured creditors be treated equally."); Poynor v. Twin City Motor Supply,
Inc., 47 Wash. App. 654, 660, 737 P.2d 270, 273-74 (1987) (dictum stating that secured parties have priority over general creditors to the Article 6 total purchase price in a bulk
transfer); see also Harris, Practicing Under Existing Bulk Sales Law-'-And a Look at the
Future of Article 6, 22 U.C.C. L.J. 195, 211 (1990) ("If the goods are subject to a security
interest ... the transferee who fails to satisfy the debt secured by the ... security interest
may be liable in conversion to the ... secured party.").
37. Figearo, 79 Bankr. at 918.
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general creditors exist, no creditor has an in rem right against
property of the seller before the bulk sale. When collateral is sold,
and proceeds are created and held by the buyer for the benefit of
the general creditors, each creditor obtains an in rem interest (in
the cash) simultaneously. 38 Since the rule of "first in time is first in
right" cannot apply to simultaneously created property rights, pro
rata sharing is appropriate among the general creditors. 39 But
when a secured party claims the inventory prior to the sale, the
secured party has a senior right to cash proceeds under Article 9. 40
True, the secured party's lien on the cash arises precisely at the
same time the property rights of the general creditors arise. 41 That
is, the perfected security interest was simultaneously created
along with the general creditors' in rem rights. Under Article 9,
ties between a security interest and a judicial lien go to the secured
party.42 If the in rem rights of general creditors are equated with
38. For the view that Article 6 bulk.sales law creates an in rem property interest that
resembles an unperfected security interest, see Johnson v. Mid States Screw & Bolt Co., 733
F.2d 1535, 1536 (11th Cir. 1984); see also Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law as a Property
Right, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 843 (1987). The recognition that general creditors have in rem
rights against the inventory is much superior to the less adequate idea of the transfer being
"ineffective" as section 6-110 states. The "ineffectiveness" language leads to strange judicial
behavior. In Pastimes Publishing Co. v. Advertising Displays, 6 Ill: App. 3d 414, 286 N.E.2d
19 (1972), a secured party claiming accounts receivable was denied an account that came
from a noncomplying bulk sale. The court reasoned that the sale was "ineffective," and so
the resulting account did not exist! This fanciful argument would destroy any secured
party's claim to proceeds of inventory whenever the inventory is sold in a noncomplying
bulk sale. Pastimes, 286 N.E.2d at 22.
39. See Rome Indus., Inc. v. Intsel Southwest, 683 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984) (general creditor who garnishes the Article 6 fund in the hands of an escrow agent
entitled only to pro rata share).
40. u.c.c. § 9-306(2) (1987).
41. That is, when the bulk buyer pays cash, the general creditors obtain an in rem
property right to the cash at precisely the same moment as the perfected secured party. It
may be true that, when the seller owned the inventory, the secured party already had a lien
and the general creditors had none. But this does not mean that the secured party .had a
lien on cash proceeds earlier than the general creditors received their in rem right. A security interest on the inventory arises at a different time from the security interest on cash
proceeds of the inventory.
42. The theory of the tie between the security interest and the judicial lien goes as
follows. According to section 9-201, the secured party always wins unless a specific provision
in Article 9 says otherwise. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1987). In case of a tie between perfecting a
security interest and the creation of a judicial lien, no provision helps the lien creditor, and
so the secured party wins under section 9-201. Section 9-301(1)(b) states, "An unperfected
security interest is subordinate to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor before
the security interest is perfected." U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1987) (emphasis added). This provision cannot help the lien creditor in a tie. The lien creditor must have "become a lien
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judicial liens, 43 or, better still, if the bulk buyer .is considered a
creditor representative in the nature of an assignee for the benefit
of creditors, and hence a lien creditor on behalf of all general creditors, 44 then Article 9 priorities dictate that the secured party
outranks the general creditors as to the Article 6 fund. 45 Under this
theory, simultaneity affects the general creditors inter se but not
the secured party versus the general creditors. On this view, section 6-106(3) becomes a mini-bankruptcy provision, with secured
parties coming first and general creditors sharing the remainder on
a pro rata basis.
The newly revised Article 6 obviates any confusion over the
obligation to distribute the proceeds "pro rata." According to new
section 6-104(1)(e), the bulk buyer is to distribute the "net contract price in accordance with· the undertakings of the buyer in the
schedule of distribution." 46 This distribution rule clearly puts perfected secured parties above the general creditors.
creditor" before perfection, not at the same time. Carlson & Shupack, Judicial Lien Priorities Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Part I, 5 CARDOZO L, REv. 287, 34446 (1984) [hereinafter Carlson & Shupack, Part I].
43. The in rem rights of general creditors in this situation have been compared to an
unperfected security interest. Note, supra note 38, at 847-48, 854-60. ·
44. See U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1987) ("A 'lien creditor' ... includes an assignee for benefit
of creditors from the time of assignment, and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the
filing of the petition or a receiver in equity from the time of appointment."); see also Anderson & Clayton Co. v. Earnest_, 610 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Te:x:. Civ. App. 1980) (comparing the
bulk buyer to a receiver). Whether the definition of "lien creditor" is expansive or restrictive
has divided. the commentators. Compare Carlson & Shupack, Judicial Lien Priorities
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code:. Part II-Creditor Representatives,
Bank Receivers, Fixtures, Crops, and Accessions, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 823, 828-35 (1984)
[hereinafter Carlson & Shupack, Part II] (bank receivers should fall within the definition,
even though not appointed by a court) with Hansford & Speegle, Lien Creditor Status
Under the UCC-Does the FDIC Qualify?, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 13 (1983) (bank receivers should
not fall within the definition of lien creditors).
45. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1987).
46. Id. § 6-104(1)(e) (1988) (emphasis added). Revised section 6-102(1)(k) defines "net
contract price" as:
the new consideration the buyer is obligated to pay for the assets less:
(i) the amount of any proceeds of the sale of an asset, to the extent the
proceeds are applied in partial or total satisfaction of a debt secured by the
asset; and
(ii) the amount of any debt to the extent it is secured by a security interest or lien that is enforceable against the asset before and after it has been sold
to a buyer.

1990]

Bulk Sales Under Article 9

C.

745

Bulk Sales as Waiver of the Security Interest

The above view that the secured party should not get a double
entitlement-cash and collateral-has yet to be reconciled with the
actual language of Article 9, which does admittedly authorize such
double entitlements.47 Professor Harris suggests a theory whereby
the McBee dictum can be brought within the terms of Article 9,
although, in the end, he criticizes the theory as inadequate.48 According to Harris's theory, secured parties implicitly authorize the
sale of the collateral whenever a buyer complies with the provisions of Article 6, and hence their security interests disappear
upon the bulk sale.49 Harris writes, "The unstated premise for the
McBee court's view that a complying buyer in bulk takes free of a
perfected security interest may be the court's belief that, by failing
to assert its security interest in the face of a bulk sale notice, the
secured party 'otherwise' authorizes the sale."110
Harris disagrees with this version of McBee's justification, because a secured party cannot authorize a sale unless the secured
party knows of the sale. 111 Yet, Harris thinks, compliance with Article 6 does not guarantee this. 112 For instance, the seller may leave
the secured party off the creditor's list, and the bulk buyer need
only inform those on the list of the sale and other persons known
to hold or assert claims against the transferor. 113 "Thus," Harris
concludes, "to the extent that the McBee court's notion that a
complying bulk transfer ipso facto terminates a perfected security
interest is based on a theory of implied authorization or waiver,
the notion is without foundatiop. " 114
This implied authorization theory, however, can be rehabilitated from this particular criticism. I think perfected secured
parties will always know of a bulk sale, and hence it is possible to
47. u.c.c. § 9-306(2) (1987).
48. Harris, supra note 1, at 199-200.
49. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1987) ("a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale ... unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party").
50. Harris, supra note 1, at 199.
51. Id. at 199 n.90.
52. Id. at 200.
53. U.C.C. § 6-107(3) (1987) ("The notice in any case shall be delivered personally or
sent ... to all persons shown on the list of creditors furnished by the transferor (Section 6104) and to all other persons who are known to the transferee to hold or assert claims
against the transferor.").
54. Harris, supra note 1, at 200.
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argue that they authorize the bulk sale by failing to protest it. If
the security interest in the seller's inventory is perfected, a financing statement has necessarily been filed. Therefore, the buyer is
always able to find out the identity of the secured party. The buyer
is said to have "constructive notice" of the perfected security interest; the whole notion of Article 9 filing is that the buyer is
supposed to check the files for previous security interests. From
this, it is a short step to the conclusion that, for the purposes of
Article 6, the buyer has a duty to look in the files. Such a duty
cannot be found in section 1-201(25), which provides: "A person
'knows' or has 'knowledge' of a fact when he has actual knowledge
of it." 55 But it can. be found in section 1-201(27), which states:
[K]nowledge ... received by an organization is effective for a particular transaction from the time when it is brought to the attention of
the individual conducting that transaction, and in any event from
the time when it would have been brought to his attention if the
organization had exercised due diligence.1' 6

The argument would be that notice has been brought to the attention of the secured party from the time the buyer should have seen
it in the files. Consequently, for a buyer to be declared in compliance, she must have notified all perfected secured parties. Since
the premise of the McBee opinion is. that the buyer has complied
with Article 6, the perfected secured party has already received notice and therefore might plausibly be said to .authorize a bulk sale
by remaining silent. 57
55. U.C.C. § 1-201(25)(a) (1987).
56. Id. § 1-201(27) (emphasis added). See also Harris, supra note 36, at 208 ("A court
might impute knowledge of creditors to a transferee who affirmatively avoids discovering
their existence or might impose liability on the transferee for failing to act in good faith."
(citing U.C.C. § 1-203)).
57. It is probably bad manners to quote another article on a different topic against
Professor Harris, but, with regard to lessees, he made an "implied authorization" argument
that is similar to the one he rejects with regard to bulk transfers. See Harris, The Rights of
Creditors Under Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REv. 803, 813-15 (1988).
The precise problem that Harris faced in this other article is whether lessees in the
ordinary course of a merchant's business take free of the security interest on inventory (for
the duration of the lease). Professor Harris thought that "buyers" was not broad enough to
cover "lessees," but he willingly argued that secured parties impliedly authorize the leasing
of inventory, and hence lessees take free of the security interest under section 9-306(2):
When the collateral is the debtor's equipment, the secured party is most unlikely to
authorize the debtor to lease the equipment free of the security interest. However,
when the collateral is inventory that the debtor is in the business of leasing, then the
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This point is strengthened by, and even dependent upon, the
observation that, in Texas, the proceeds are kept on hand by the
transferee for the benefit of the secured party, 58 so that the secured party has good reason, in the abstract, to approve of the
bulk sale. Furthermore, it cannot be said in such a situation that
mere acquiescence prejudices the secured party because the proceeds remain in place for a time after the sale goes through. 59 In
jurisdictions where the buyer is authorized to (and actually does)
hand over the proceeds directly to the debtor, 60 an argument for
implied authorization would seem to be much weaker because a
secured party who is merely slow, rather than genuinely acquiescent, may more likely be prejudiced by not responding to the
notice of the bulk sale.
One major problem with this view is that the debtor. and the
buyer have little incentive to maximize the price when the collateral is overencumbered-i.e., when no positive debtor equity exists.
If the seller and the buyer have negotiated an unreasonably low
price, then it should not be the case that a quiescent secured party
should be taken as approving the sale. 61 Yet if the sales price exceeds the amount of the secured claim, or if the negotiated price is
security agreement may explicitly authorize the debtor to hold the goods for lease.
Even if the security agreement is silent on that point, a court may infer the secured
party's authorization for ordinary course leases from the secured party's conduct, including the fact that the secured party, without objecting, knowingly permitted the
debtor to offer the goods for lease.
Id. at 814. This is precisely the argument that can be offered in defense of the McBee dictum. If it works with regard to leases of inventory, if ought to work for sales of inventory out
of the ordinary course (provided the buyer holds the proceeds for the secured party).
58. TEX. Bus. & CoM. ConE ANN. § 6.106(1) (Vernon 1968).
59. According to section 6-106 comment 3:
The methods by which the buyer may perform the duty stated in the section are
various. He may, for instance, by agreement with the seller hold the consideration in
his own hands until the debts are ascertained, or deposit it in an account subject to
checks bearing his counter-signature, or deposit it in escrow with an independent
agency. If the affairs of the seller are so involved that nothing else is practical the
buyer will no doubt pay the consideration into the registry of an appropriate court
and interplead the seller's creditors.
U.C.C. § 6-106 comment 3 (1987).
60. That is, in jurisdictions adopting the weak version of Article 6, buyers are not
required to keep proceeds on hand for creditors.
61. It can also be said that the secured party has a full opportunity to object to the
terms of the sale in advance and thereby the secured party can be presumed to have authorized the sale. Hence, the danger of a shockingly low sales price does not necessarily work to
defeat the theory that a secured party impliedly authorizes a bulk sale once notified of the
sale.
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reasonable, then the authorization theory raised and criticized by
Professor Harris seems not so implausible.
To summarize, according to the face of the language in Article
9, a complying buyer should prevail over a previous perfected security interest only if it is true that the secured party has
authorized the bulk sale by acquiescing to it. 62 The case for acquiescence depends upon the secured party remaining silent. after
having been informed of the bulk sale. This argument should only
be allowed in those states with the strong version of Article 6
where the buyer must hold the proceeds for the seller's creditors.
Sound ethical arguments might be made for allowing complying
buyers to take free of these security interests in states where the
buyer holds the proceeds for the benefit of the secured party. That
is, a secured party should have a surviving lien or the cash proceeds, but not both. When a sale is within the ordinary course of
business, Article 9 clearly gives the secured party both (unless the
secured party waives the lien), 63 but the justice of this double entitlement can be questioned, where the buyer holds the cash
proceeds for the secured party to collect. 64
II.

THE UNPERFECTED SECURED PARTY AND THE COMPLYING

BUYER

The southwest quadrant of Figure One is, or should be, an
easy case-the only one a complying buyer might clearly win. If
SP1 has not perfected, and if the buyer is a bona fide purchaser,
62. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
64. According to section 6-103(3), "[t]ransfers in settlement or realization of a lien or
other security interests" are exempt from the provisions of Article 6. U.C.C. § 6-103(3)
(1987). Therefore, if inventory is sold and if all the cash is given to a secured party, then,
arguably, no further compliance with Article 6 is required. See Techsonic Indus. v. Barney's
Bassin' Shop, 621 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); American Metal Finishers, Inc. v.
Palleschi, 55 A.D.2d 499, 501, 391 N.Y.S.2d 170, 172 (1977); but see Hixson v. Pride of Tex.
Distrib. Co., 683 S. W.2d 173, 178 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (Article 6 does not apply only if the
secured party gets all the cash and the security agreement was in default); accord Stone's
Pharmacy v. Pharmacy Accounting Management, Inc., 812 F.2d 1063, 1066-67 (8th Cir.
1987) (Texas law). According to one case, the exemption applies only if the inventory is
transferred directly to the secured party in satisfaction of the security interest. Starman v.
John Wolfe, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 377, 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). The Starman case has been reinterpreted as one in which a security agreement was not in default, the secured party had
no right to foreclose, and not all the cash was given to the secured party, so that Article 6
still applied. Techsonic Indus., 621 S.W.2d at 334.
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the buyer should "take free" of the security interest. Of course, if
the buyer has knowledge of the unperfected security interest, then
the security interest lives on and is fully enforceable and perfectible.65 This result is set forth in section 9-301(1)(c):
[A]n unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of
(c) in the case of goods ... , a person who is not a secured
party and who is a transferee in bulk or other buyer not in
ordinary course of business or is a buyer of farm products in
ordinary course of business, to the extent that he gives value
and receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the
security interest and before it is perfected. 66

Notice this provision does not quite say that, in case of a bona fide
purchaser, the security interest is dead. Rather, it is subordinate to
the rights of the buyer. Yet, subordination should be understood to
comprehend the termination of the junior security interest.

A.

The ATASCO Case

Unfortunately, this notion that subordinated liens are dead
was rejected by the Second Circuit in Aircraft Trading & Services,
Inc. v. Braniff, Inc. (ATASCO). 67 In ATASCO, the court was faced
with a priority dispute resembling the one portrayed in Figure
Three:

65. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c) (1987).
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. 819 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987).
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The case started with ATASCO's sale of a jet engine to the debtor
on credit, secured by a purchase money security interest. Before
ATASCO perfected,68 the debtor affixed the engine to an airplane
and sold the whole plane (including the engine) to B (Northeastern). Bin turn sold the plane to B 2 (Braniff) who sold the plane to
B 3 (Condren, an individual). B 3 then leased the plane to B 4 with
an option to buy. This lease was not filed with the FAA, as required by federiil law. 69 At this point, ATASCO finally filed a
financing statement. When B 4 exercised its option to buy, B 4 could
have found a financing statement in the federal files pertaining to
aircraft and related parts. 70
Judge Miner, speaking for the Second Circuit, ruled that,
SPi's security interest was resuscitated as soon as B 3 sold to B 4 , so
that it could be asserted against the property of B4 •71 According to
Miner:
68. See 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1982). Although filing must occur pursuant to federal law,
the significance of perfection of a security interest is determined entirely under the UCC.
ATASCO, 819 F.2d at 1231-32; see generally Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406
(1983); M. RICE, ASSET FINANCING 251-70 (1989).
69. The consequence of the unrecorded lease is explored infra in the text accompanying notes 97-106.
70. See 49 U.S.C. § 1403(f) (1982).
71. ATASCO, 819 F.2d at 1233.
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It is critical to note for the discussion that follows that
ATASCO's unperfected security interest, though subordinate, continued to exist. Section 9-301(1) explicitly provides that "an
unperfected security interest is subordinate" to the rights of certain
buyers and lien creditors. The language of subordination indicates
that the secured party's rights live on, although junior to the buyer's
rights. Contrast the language of section 9-307-"[a] buyer in the ordinary course . . . takes free of a security interest created by his
seller"-which terminates the secured party's interest for all time.
Some courts seemingly ignore the subordination language of section
9-301(1) and state that a senior buyer "takes free" of an unperfected
security interest, but those cases do not involve subsequent buyers
and apparently use the phrases "takes free" and "has priority over"
interchangeably. 72

Once the court established that ATASCO's security interest lived
on, it necessarily followed that B 4 was not a buyer who took collateral subject to an unperfected security interest. Rather, B 4 took
collateral subject to a perfected security interest, and hence section
9-301(1)(c) did not apply to protect B4•73
72. Id. (citations omitted and emphasis in original). Judge Miner concluded that section 9-307(1) extinguishes a security interest. That section refers to the buyer in the
ordinary course of business "taking free" of security interests on inventory. U.C.C. § 9307(1) (1987). However, Miner determined that B 2 was not a buyer in the ordinary course,
and so the "taking free" language .did not apply. ATASCO, ·819 F.2d at 1232-33.
73. Because the collateral had been affixed to a plane, which was not collateral, section
9-314, 'pertaining to accessions, should have applied. See Sigman, The Wild Blue Yonder:
Interests in Aircraft Under Our Federal System, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 316, 370-73 (1973). This
was overlooked entirely by the court and by the litigators. As it turns out, the case could
have been decided the same way under section 9-314. According to section 9-314(1), "A
security interest in goods· which attaches before they are installed in or affixed to other
goods takes priority as to the goods installed or affixed (called in this section 'accessions')
over the claims of all persons to the whole except as stated in subsection (3) .... " U.C.C. §
9-314(1) (1987) (emphasis added). That is, ATASCO should have won unless something in
section 9-314(3) states otherwise. However, section 9-314(3) does state otherwise: "The security interests described in subsection[] (1) ... do not take priority over (a) a subsequent
purchaser for value of any interest in the whole ... if the subsequent purchase is made ...
without knowledge of the security interest and before it was perfected." U.C.C. § 9-314(3)
(1987). The two subsections, read together, establish that B "takes priority" over ATASCO.
Thus, if the court had analyzed the problem under section 9-314, as it probably should
have done, the court still would have faced the question, "What does it mean for a buyer
without knowledge to take priority over an unperfected security interest?" This question is
simply the obverse of asking, "What does it mean for an unperfected security interest to be
subordinate to a buyer without knowledge?" There is no reason to believe that Judge Miner
would have come out the other way. See ATASCO, 819 F.2d at 1233 (castigating the Ninth
Circuit for "us[ing] the phrases 'takes free' and 'has priority over' interchangeably").
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The argument that "subordination" ought to mean killing off
an unperfected security interest was specifically rejected by Judge
Miner. 74 Though not entirely unimpressed with the argument, he
remarked:
We decline ... to interpret section 9-301(1) in a manner that would
give "subordinate" two different meanings in the same sentence depending -upon the particular subsection that is relevant to the case
at bar-section 9-301(l)(c) (buyers not in the ordinary course of
business) or section 9-30l(l)(b) (lien creditors). Rather, we are convinced that a plain reading of the statute requires that
"subordinate" be given consistent meaning within section 9-301, and
that the difference in phrasing between sections 9-301(1.) ("is
subordinate") and 9-307 ("takes free") is to be given effect, notwithstanding cases that use language of termination interchangeably
with language of subordination. 75
_/

Thus, Miner feared attributing two different meanings to the word
''subordinate"-one for buyers and one for secured parties and
other lien creditors. Therefore, an absurd result was reached in an
attempt to preserve a single denotative sense to the word
"subordinate."
-

B. Death and Subordination
Despite ATASCO, a good argument can be made that subordination means d~ath whether the subsequent taker is a buyer, a
secured party, or a lien creditor. If such a result can be shown,
then Judge Miner's reading of section 9-30l(l)(c) could be proved
wrong. That is, it would be true that "takes free of' and "is
subordinate to" are one and the same thing.
What Judge Miner could have said, in pursuit of his point of view, is that B 4 was not "a
subsequent purchaser for value" of the whole "before it was perfected." Hence, B 4 would
not have been a protected subsequent purchaser. This Dracula aspect of section 9-314(3)
was also included in the substantially identical 1962 version of the fixture priority statute.
U.C.C. § 9~313 (1962). One of the motivations for the 1972 amendments to section 9-313 was
to remove any implication that a senior real estate mortgage could become junior to an
Article 9 fixture security interest if the mortgage was assigned. See Carlson, Fixture Priorities, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 381, 403-04 (1983). However, section 9-314 was left untouched (with
its anti-shelter implication intact) in 1972 because no one had made a fuss about accessions
like they had about fixtures.
74. ATASCO, 819 F.2d at 1233.
75. Id. at 1234.
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With buyers and bulk transferees, it is easy to imagine how
subordination could ·mean the death of the security interest. Once
a buyer or bulk transferee takes possession of the collateral, the
security interest simply dies with the buyer or bulk transferee having clean title to convey to another. 76 But "subordination as death"
is equally applicable in the case of subsequent liens. That is, if a
second secured party or second judicial lien creditor takes collateral encumbered by an earlier unperfected security interest (and if
the party of the second part is senior), then the second lienholder
takes free of the earlier unperfected security interest, just the same
as the subsequent good faith buyer did.
With regard to second senior lienholders, some explanation is
required since most people will claim that the first unperfected security interest continues to exist even after the second security
interest or judicial lien attaches. In order to show that subordination means death, even when the senior party holds a competing
security 'interest, let us imagine the simplest conceivable Article 9
priority problem, whereby SP1 .and SP2 have both received their
security interests from the same debtor. In addition, SP1 has failed
to perfect and SP2 is a bona fide purchaser for value who has perfected. Finally, SP2 has repossessed and has held a foreclosure sale,
where B 2 is the buyer. This priority contest is presented in Figure
Four:
Time----.

SP1 (unperfected)

t____
i.------

First in time

Debtor

Second in time
B2
Buyer at foreclosure sale

SP2 (perfected)
Third in time
Figure Four

76.

U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c) (1987).

_j-
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It could be said that SP2 takes free of (or has killed off) SPi's unperfected security interest in the following sense: subject to the
complications caused by a perfection rule, a security interest is the
right to sell whatever the debtor has at the time of attachment. 77
Of course, this basic formula, without more, guarantees that, if SP2
exercises this power of sale, SP1's security interest lives on. But
this formula is altered by Article 9's perfection rule. This perfection rule allows SP2 (if she perfects first) to sell not merely
whatever the debtor had at the time of attachment, but to sell free
of SP1's unperfected security interest as well. 78 Meanwhile, if SP2
has not perfected, SP2 may be able to sell less than what the
debtor had at the time of attachment, if the debtor conveys a subsequent security interest to a subsequent lender who perfects
first. 79
In Figure Four, we can say that SP2 has taken free of SPi's
security interest, when viewed from the perspective. of what SP2
can sell to a buyer at a foreclosure sale. To say it another way, SP2
is competent to convey good title to a buyer at the foreclosure sale
that is free and clear of SPi's security interest. In this sense,
viewed from the perspective of the title SP2's buyer can get, SP2
takes free of SPi's security interest. 80 Thus, subordination of a security interest implies death no matter whether the senior party
has a lien or the rights of a buyer.
Now pending SP2's foreclosure sale, the first lien admittedly
continues to exist, for some purposes. This is because SP2 did not
purport to take an absolute interest in the collateral. Rather, SP2
has left to the debtor an equity interest in the collateral-an equity that has already been conveyed away to SP1• But SPi's rights
to the debtor's equity are fully subject to SP2's power of sale. In
77. See generally Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment, supra note 32, at 508-09; Carlson, Death and Subordination, supra note 32, at 558-63; Dolan, The U.C.C. Framework:
Conveyancing Principles and Property Interests, 59 B.U.L. REV. 811 (1979).
78. "When collateral is. disposed of by a secured party after default, the disposition
transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein, discharges the security
interest under which it is made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto."
U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (1987) (emphasis added). The italicized portion of section 9-504(4) establishes the power of a senior secured party to transfer more than what the debtor had at the
time her security interest attached.
79. As the debtor did to SP1 in Figure Four.
80. Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment, supra note 32, at 513 n.38.
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terms of what SP2 can convey to the buyer in a foreclosure sale,
SPi's lien is already dead. Meanwhile, if we change SP2 into a full
buyer, no equity is left to the debtor. If no equity is left to the
debtor, then SP1 has no property rights either (because SPi's
rights were strictly parasitic on the existence of a debtor equity).
That is, if the debtor sells to an ignorant buyer, the security interest of SP1 is dead for all purposes.
Thus, whether the debtor double-deals the collateral to a subsequent buyer or a subsequent secured party, SP1's security
interest has been terminated-as demonstrated by what happens
when the senior transferee transfers to B 2 in Figure Four. A subordinated security interest is a dead security interest, and the word
"subordination'' has but a single meaning for all transferees.
This principle-subsequent but senior transferees take free of
the earlier subordinated· security interest-is sometimes called the
"shelter principle. " 81 This architectural metaphor is designed to
capture the idea that the transferees from a bona fide purchaser
are "sheltered" by the bona fide purchaser's status and therefore
need not have any such status themselves. Thus, in Figure Four,
B 2 takes good title from SP 2 even though SP1 may have perfected
her ·security interest by the time of the auction because B 2 comes
within the "shelter" of SP2's seniority. I have come to view this
"shelter" metaphor as unaesthetic, 82 because "shelter" wrongly implies that, outside of the shelter, SP1's security interest continues
to prowl. In fact the wolf is dead. "Shelter" is not needed. It would
be better to say that the earlier subordinated security interest has
been killed off, so that when the bona fide purchaser transfers the
property to another, the dead lien is simply not a factor. It is safe
for B 2 (in Figure Four) to sleep out under the stars, if she wants to.
Clearly, Judge Miner was wrong to rule that "subordination"
in all contexts must mean that the junior security interest continues to exist. The opposite is true. The fixed meaning of
subordination should be that the unperfected security interest
ceases to exist. Taking free and clear has different details from
context to context, but the idea is essentially uniform across all
subsequent transfers. Thus, B 4 , in the ATASCO case, should have
81. E.g., Proposed PEB Commentaries, [Current Materials] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan), Current Materials Highlights Part II, at 2-3 (July, 1989).
82. Admittedly, I used this phrase routinely in previous articles. See Carlson, Death
and Subordination, supra note 32.
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bought clean title through the initial buyer, who "took free" of
SP1's unperfected security interest. 83
In any case, on a practical level, Judge Miner's reading of the
UCC is patently absurd, as the following example will show. Suppose B buys collateral for $100 from the debtor. Unbeknownst to
B, the collateral is encumbered by SP1's unperfected security interest for $80. After B buys, SP1 files a financing statement that
was adequate to perfect a still-living security interest. According to
ATASCO, Bis senior but the security interest of SP1 is not dead.
Presumably this means that, so long as the collateral is in the possession of B, SP1 is unable to repossess. But if B sells to someone
else, SP1 will be senior again and able to repossess.
In this case, B has collateral worth $100 to B, but if B tries to
sell the collateral to anyone else who knows about the security interest, that party will deduct the $80 that SP1 claims and will pay
$20. In essence, the rule of ATASCO makes the property of Binalienable (although, in the precise example I used, B 2's equity
interest of $20 was itself still valuable). Thus, if B, a bona fida
purchaser, chooses to sell she is hurt. Subsequent purchasers are
not hurt, because they simply reduce the purchase price by the
amount of SPi's claim. Meanwhile, the double-dealing debtor has
probably received full price from B, who did not know of SPi's
unperfected security interest. And SP1, who forgot to perfect,
eventually realizes the full $80 secured claim. Under the rule of
ATASCO, only the innocent bona fide purchaser for value is hurt,
and absolutely everyone else in the universe _is all right and enjoying a good laugh at her predicament. Yet, it is precisely the
innocent bona fide purchaser who is supposed to be protected by
section 9-301(l)(c). 84
Judge Miner offers some consequentialist reasoning in defense
of his _decision. He writes:
83. In any case, it must be said that, at the level of language philosophy, Judge
Miner's notion that words have fixed meaning is impossible. Since Wittgenstein, most philosophers have thought that words do not have meaning in and of themselves, but only have
meaning as supplied by context. Therefore, although Judge Miner thought he was adhering
to the one and only meaning of the word "subordination," he was in fact sub rosa switching
contexts in order to preserve the illusion that meaning stayed fixed. If meaning is in the
context (and not the words), then Judge Miner was guilty of switching meanings around, in
the name of fixing the meaning.
84. U.C.C. § 9-30l(l)(c) (1987).
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The rule appellees urge us to adopt [equating death and subordination] effectively would freeze a secured party's priority status as of
the time of the first intervening conveyance: If one failed to file a
security interest the day of the sale, the buyer could, by immediately reselling, forever destroy the security interest. While appellees
urge that their rule would result in an increment of certainty in such
transactions, we believe that such an extreme result would discourage lenders from taking security interests and would thereby inhibit
commerce. 85

This argument; however, profoundly misunderstands what a
perfection rule is. The whole point of a perfection rule is to empower the debtor to double-deal the lender-in order to induce the
lender to take the required perfective steps. This is not to say that
double-dealing is a good thing in and of itself. Rather, the power to
double-deal is the tool which encourages a secured party to perfect
her interest. Therefore, asserting a fear of a double-dealing debtor
cannot constitute an argument that relieves a secured party of the
need to perfect. 86 Taken to its extreme, Miner's argument dictates
that Article 9 .be repealed altogether and replaced with a simple
rule of "first in tim.e is first in right."
C.

ATASCO and Shelter

Dissatisfaction wi.th the ATASCO holding has· prompted the
members of the Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) of the UCG to
decree a "Proposed New Comment 9 to section 9-301," plus an additional proposed commentary on section 9-301(1). 87 Disagreeing
with ATASCO's rejection of the shelter doctrine in that case, the
proposed commentary states., "The shelter principle should be applied to protect [the sub-buyer]. Otherwise the value of [the
buyer's] status, as one taking free of the security interest, is unjus85.. Aircraft Trading & Servs., Inc. v. Braniff, .Inc., 819 F.2d 1227, 1235 (2d Cir. 1987).
86. See generally, Carlson, Rationality, Accident, and Priority Un<J,er Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 71 MINN. L. REV. 207, 215-16 (1986) (publication or recording of
liens in a central location may cost less than the buyer's investments in title investigation
and/or title insurance; a perfection requirement facilitates the movement of goods to highvalue uses).
87. Proposed PEB Commentaries, [Current Materials] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan), Current Material Highlights Part II, at 3 (July, 1989).
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tifiably . impaired if he cannot confer that status upon his
transferee." 88
The PEB then offers its new proposed "official" comment to
section 9-301:
There is no conflict between the principle of § 9-301(1) and the
"shelter principle," which is applied at several points in the statute,
but is most explicitly stated in § 2-403(1): "A purchaser of goods
acquires all title which his transferor had.... ''
Althm1gh subsection (1) fails to state the shelter principle expressly, that principle is applicable where a person who had met the
conditions for prevailing over an unperfected security interest trans- .
fers his right to another pei:son after the security interest is
perfected. 89

By this proposed comment, the PEB hopes to overrule ATASCO.
However, the comment is subject to a logical flaw.
In ATASCO, the lawyers for B 4 argued that under UCC section 2-403, which provides, "A purchaser of goods acquires all title
which his transferor had or had power to trans£er except that a
purchaser of a limited interest acquires. rights only to the extent of
the interest purchased,"90 B 4 acquired . B's immunity from
ATASCO's security interest. That is, B's "title" included this immunity,. and B 4 . succeede.d to it. 91 Judge Miner disposed of this
"novel theory" 92 by noting that, according to section 9-306(2), a
security interest continues upon sale of the collateral (unless the
secured party consents) "[e]xcept where this Article otherwise provides."93 An Article 2 provision therefore is not competent to vary
the rule of section 9-306(2). 94 Furthermore, section 2-4O2(3)(a) provides, "Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to impair the rights
of creditors of the seller . . . under the provisions of the Article on
Secured Transactions (Article 9) .... " 95 This provision also disables section 2-403(1) from affecting unperfected security interests.
.

88.
89.
L.J. 134,
403(1)).
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.; see also Harrell, Sales-Related Conflicts Between Articles 2 and 9, 22 U.C.C.
173-74 (1989) (criticizing the ATASCO court for overlooking shelter in section 2-

u.c.c. § 2-403(1) (1987).
)
Aircraft Trading & Servs., Inc. v. Braniff, Inc., 819 F.2d 1227, 1234 (2d Cir. 1987).
Id.
Id. at 1235 (quoting U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1987)).
Id.
Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-402(3)(a) (1987)).
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Finally, the very text of section 2-403(1) requires us to know what
title the seller has the power to convey, but this question is only
settled by reference to section 9-301(1)(c). 96
For these reasons, the PEB's invocation of the shelter provision in section 2~403 is poor theory. It is better to face up to the
fact that section 9-301(1)(c) is a murderer. It kills off the security
interest altogether-and that Judge Miner (sitting in diversity,
mind you, and therefore merely guessing at the content of state
law) simply made an error.

D.

ATASCO's Application of a Race-Notice Priority Between
Unperfected Secured Parties and Lessors

ATASCO involved one other issue which many may find bizarrely decided but which I would like to defend. In Figure Three,
recall that B 3 leased the airplane to B 4 at a time when ATASCO
had not yet perfected its security interest. This might have raised
the issue of whether a lessee takes free of an unperfected security
interest-an issue not settled directly by Article 9. 97 Judge Miner
evaded this issue and found that ATASCO must win because
ATASCO filed ·before the lessee did. He found authorization for
this decision in section 9-312(5)(a), which provides, "Conflicting
security interests rank according to priority in time of filing or
perfection."98 Judge Miner thought this rule subordinated the subsequent lessee because the lessee was the second to file. 99
Some will be tempted to criticize Judge Miner for using a section that pertains to competing security interests to solve a priority
problem between a security interest and a leasehold interest. I
think Judge Miner's reasoning is not so bad. Ordinarily, lessees
and buyers do not have to file anything to perfect their interests in
96. Carlson, Death and Subordination, supra note 32, at 550 n.9.
97. Although not directly settled, it is arguable under section 9-301(1)(c) which protects "buyers," not lessees, that lessees are temporary buyers and that the lease is therefore
good against the unperfected secured party. Meanwhile, the unperfected security interest
would continue to encumber the. lessor's reversionary interest in the collateral. "Buyer" is
more or less an undefined term under the UCC, so that there is no impediment to such an
argument. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1987) (" 'Buying' ... does not include a transfer in bulk or
as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt."). For a thorough analysis
of whether lessees can come under various Article 9 provisions, see Harris, supra note 57, at
815-16.
98. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1987).
99. ATASCO, 819 F.2d at 1236; see 49 U.S.C. app. § 1403(c) (1982).
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personal property. 10° Federal law changes this with regard to civil
aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, appliances, or spare parts. 101 If
Congress has decided that buying and leasing should be subject to
a perfection rule, then it seems appropriate that section 9312( 5)(a) should apply as a supplement to section 9-301(1)(c).
That is, a buyer of an airplane without knowledge of an unperfected security interest in the airplane should take priority over
(i.e., take free of) the earlier unperfected security interest, but this
result is reversed if the secured party is the first to file. 102 Or, to
say it another way, federal law, when combined with the DCC, creates a race-notice priority between buyers or lessees and secured
parties. 103
If buyers and lessees are subjected to a perfection rule, then a
race-notice priority is useful to protect the aftermarket for security
interests in airplanes. If I may quote myself:
li1 a race-notice' priority, A and B have not perfected. B is a BFP
[bona fide purchaser for value]. Between A and B, the first to perfect wins, so that A has the potential to regain priority from a BFP.
Thus, A and B are engaged in a race,, but only if B was a BFP at the
time B. gave value. This is done to protect the· aftermarket. If A is
. the first to perfect and wants to sell to X, X could never tell from

the record that A was not really the owner or that B ·(the BFP)
was.104
100. One exception is thaf buyers of accounts and chattel paper are subject to Article
9 filing requirements. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (1987); but see id. § 9-104(f) (excluding some
sales of accounts and chattel paper).
101. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1403 (1982).
102. See Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406, 413 (1983) ("Although state
law determines priorities, all interests must be federally recorded before they can obtain
whatever priority to which they are entitled under state law.").
103. If I may add a few arcane refinements, federal law requires that notice of leases
and liens on engines and planes be filed. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1403(a)(2) (1982). It also requires
that notices of purchases of aircraft be filed. Id. § 1403(a)(l). It does not require that outright purchases of aircraft engines be filed. M. RICE, supra note 68, at 253. Therefore,
between secured parties and buyers of aircraft, the UCC, combined with federal law, creates
a race-notice priority. But as against buyers ofairplane engines, combined federal and state
law creates only a notice priority-that is, the buyer of an engine takes free of an unperfected security interest in the engine, since such a buyer need not file.
Also, if buyers and lessors who must record are to be treated as if they are secured
parties under Article 9, pursuant to Judge Miner's suggestion, then it follows that those who
enter sell-leaseback aircraft deals with aircraft merchants are subject to section 9-307(1).
That is, just as section 9-307(1) terminates security interests in airborne inventory, it would
also terminate leases in the same inventory.
104. Carlson, supra note 86, at 259-60.
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Transposing this analysis to our airplane problem, suppose A is an
unperfected secured party and L is a lessee, as in Figure Five:

Debtor

L

t

L files second

l _ Second in time
Figure Five

If A wished to assign her security interest to X, and if X searched

the record, .L would not appear until L filed a record notice of the
lease. If L has not filed, X therefore faces a title risk if section 9312( 5)(a) does not govern. But if section 9-312(5)(a) does govern,
then X will know that A has good title to the security interest by
virtue of having filed first before any subsequent taker. Therefore,
X faces less title risk and will accordingly pay a higher price for
A's security interest. This greater marketability of the security interest will in turn make secured lending more attractive and might
lower the price of secured loans to the debtor. Therefore, if you
think that lower interest rates are a good thing, 105 Judge Miner's
adaptation of section 9-312(5)(a) is not as implausible as it might
appear at first glance. 106
105. It is often thought that lower interest rates are a good thing. However, they may
simply reflect greater costs exported to the public through, for example, limited liability of
corporations. Therefore, one must resist proclaiming lower interest rates synonymous with
efficiency. See generally Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the. Bankruptcy Code, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 577, 615-19 (1989).
106. In the above paragraph, I only wish to suggest that race-notice priorities have a
certain rationality to them. I do not wish to be understood as making some sort of law-andeconomics efficiency argument. Only a fool would say whether priorities are per se efficient
or not. Some of the issues that would have to be resolved to make an efficiency argument
include: (a) whether the debtor's business enterprises (or A's or X's) produce externalities,
such that lower interest rates and higher productivity will cause more harm than good; (b}
whether the benefits to A and X exceed the cost to B; and (c) whether making the market
for the debtor's goods or services more optimal will make other markets more or less optimal (the second best phenomenon). All of these empirical problems (and more) would
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Summary

Although the above discussion trespassed beyond the scope of
my topic to discuss the rights of an unperfected security interest
against buyers generally, everything said about buyers not in bulk
translates directly to complying bulk transferees. The thrust of the
discussion is that buyers without knowledge-whether complying
Article 6 transferees or buyers who need not comply with Article
6-always take free of unperfected security interests. That is, the
security interest ceases to exist when a buyer or bulk transferee
without knowledge acquires the collateral. ·
This is especially important for bulk transferees. Bulk transferees purchase inventory in bulk in order to put that inventory
into the ordinary course of business. Ordinarily, section 9-307(1)
terminates security interests in inventory when a customer buys
some items out of inventory. 107 But buyers in the ordinary course
of business are not protected unless the seller of the inventory has
created the security interest. A bulk transferee has not created the
security interest, and so section 9-307(1) cannot help her with unperfected security interests created by the bulk transferor. If the
ATASCO case is followed, then the unperfected security interest of
SP1 springs back to life when the bulk transferee tries to sell some
inventory to her customers. This means that SP1 can track down
the bulk transferee's customers and take back any merchandise
that the bulk transferee had acquired, even though the bulk transferee fully complied with the rules in Article 6.. Such a rule makes
bulk transfers of inventory riskier and therefore increases the exit
costs of doing business.

Ill.

THE PERFECTED SECURED PARTY AND THE NONCOMPLYING
BUYER

In the northeast quadrant of Figure One is the priority battle
between the perfected secured party and the buyer who has not
complied with Article 6. How straightforward can a priority battle
prevent any conscientious scholar from making an efficiency argument in favor of any given
priority system.
107. u.c.c. § 9-307(1) (1987).

j

1990)

Bulk Sales Under Article 9

763

be? 108 But here one can find all sorts of startling doctrinal assertions-some of them from the much maligned McBee case. In
McBee, Judge Williams determined that noncomplying bulk buyers must contribute after-acquired inventory not involved in the
bulk sale to the wronged lenders of the seller. 109 Furthermore,
Judge Williams also suggests that, under certain circumstances,
noncomplying buyers can cut off perfected security interests with
a very short (six months) statute of limitations. 11° Finally, Judge
Williams decided that SP2 could never be a bona fide purchaser
within the meaning of section 6~110, 111 which provides that bona
fide purchasers take free of Article 6 claims of creditors. 112
The first ruling can be justified, in my opinion, while the second cannot. The third ruling can be criticized as being somewhat
overbroad but not totally without merit.
A.

After-Acquired Inventory

1. Dissolving the Buyer-Seller Distinction
a. McBee.-In McBee, the noncomplying buyer not only
bought inventory from the bulk seller but later added inventory
from other sources as well. Most judges would have said that the
after-acquired property clauses in the security agreements of SP1
and SP2 (in Figure Two) could not encumber inventory acquired
later by the bulk buyer (which I will call "post-sale inventory") for
the simple reason that the bulk buyer never agreed to any afteracquired property clause. On this reasoning, SP1 and SP2 (creditors of S) would have priority as to the inventory actually involved
in the bulk transfer, and SP3 (B's creditor) would have any inventory acquired by B after the bulk sale occurred. As to this post-sale
inventory, the security interests of SP1 and SP2 would not even
108. See e.g., First Security Bank of Idaho v. Absco Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853,
664 P.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1983) (SP1 wins if B does not comply with Article 6).
109. National Bank of Tex. v. West Tex. Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714
F.2d 1316, 1330-31 (5th Cir. 1983). Other courts have held likewise. See infra text accompanying notes 125-66.
110. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1328-29. Some states lengthen this statute of limitations to a
year. E.g., CAL. CoM. CODE § 6111 (West Supp. 1990); GA. CoDE ANN. § 11-6-111 (1982).
111. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1330.
112. u.c.c. § 6-110 (1987).
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attach. 113 Judge Williams writes, "At first glance this argument is
appealing: how can a debtor-transferor give his secured creditors
an interestin property he no longer owns and, more significantly,
in post-transfer property acquired by the transferee which the
transferor never owned?" 114 But Judge Williams finds reason to
give the post-sale inventory116-to which the security interests of
SP1 and SP2 could never have attached-to SP1 and SP2:
Upon analysis, however, the facial logical persuasiveness and the equitable underpinning of this argument disappears. The transferor
gives his creditors a security interest in his property which may, as
in the immediate case, cover "after-acquired property." It is Article
6, which provides as a "sanction for non-compliance" that the transfer is ineffective against creditors of the transferor.... Clearly, a
transferee cannot complain if, by his non-compliance, the transferor's creditors' claims attach to his property as they had prior to
sale. 116

In case this argument went by you too quickly, let us take it step
by step. (1) Article 6 imposes sanctions. (2) The sanctions are that
the bulk transfer is "ineffective" against the creditors of the transferor. (3) If the transfer is ineffective, that means we must pretend
the seller still owns the collateral, and that the seller's creditors
have their old rights against the collateral. (4) And yet the buyer
now owns the collateral. (5) This contradiction can be resolved by
seeing the buyer and seller as the same person. (6) If the seller
obtained after-acquired inventory, the security interests of SP1
and SP2 would attach to it. (7) Since the buyer is the seller, the
security interests of SP1 and SP2 attach to any inventory the buyer
·might acquire later.
113. Harris, supra note 1, at 231. Attachment requires (a) a security agreement granting a security interest, (b) value given by the creditor, and (c) debtor rights in the collateral.
U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1987). The theory is that the first element of attachment is absent, because the bulk buyer had no security agreement with SP1, or SP2• But see supra note 21
(showing that in McBee, B did sign a security agreement with SP2).
114. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1328.
115. Judge Williams limited SP1 and SP2 to the value. of the inventory transferred to
B in the bulk sale. Id. at 1319, 1332. This result would adhere if Judge Williams had used
the standards for commingled collateral under section 9-315. This matter is discussed infra
in the text accompanying notes 234-43.
116. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1328 (citing TEX. Bus. & CoM. CooE ANN. § 6.106 official
comment 2 (Vernon 1968)).
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Even critics of the McBee opinion have to admit that this rea
soning is innovative-even Hegelian in quality. The immediate
appearance is· that the seller and buyer are separate persons, but,
according to Article 6, the "transfer is ineffective, " 117 and this re
sults in the sublation (Aufhebung) or merger of the seller and the
buyer into a unified category of being. Since transfers require two
persons, 118 this sublation of the buyer-seller distinction is what it
means for the transfer to be ineffective. Thus, the obligations of
the seller become the obligations of the buyer. 119
For classical liberals such as Professor Harris, such reasoning
is untenable and perhaps even incomprehensible. The buyer and
the seller are separate beings, and that's it! 120 If the transfer is in
effective between buyer and seller, it is not because the buyer
seller distinction has been obliterated. This distinction may be
taken as a deconstructible given. Rather, transfer ineffectiveness,
as invoked by Article 6, is simply a metaphor to help us imagine
legal rules governing the rights of the transferor's creditors. We are
to pretend that the specific inventory in the bulk sale was never
transferred. Then we are to imagine what rights the creditors
would have against this inventory in such a case. 121 In no sense is
the buyer now the seller, and in no way should the seller's personal
contractual obligations be attributed to the buyer.
117.
118.

Id.
See Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception
of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077, 1184
(1989).
119. Judge Williams cites some cases holding that, when a security agreement provides
that the collateral is inventory, both present and after-acquired inventory are deemed to be
covered. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1331 (citing In re Nickerson & Nickerson, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 93
(D. Neb.), aff'd, 452 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1971); In re Page, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
501, 504 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Wolfe City Nat'l Bank, 544
S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)). These cases would be apt only if one debtor granted
inventory security interests to all the secured parties in the case. They could not apply to
the facts in McBee unless it can be shown somehow that the seller's security agreement was
binding on the buyer.
120. "Even though the buyer in bulk may continue to do business under the trade
name of the seller, at the same location, and using the same assets, the two parties usually
are distinct legal persons." Harris, supra note 1, at 231; see Citizens Sav. Bank v. Sac City
State Bank, 315 N.W.2d 20, 26-28 (Iowa 1982); Burke, The Di.tty to Refile Under Section 9402(7) of the Revised Article 9, 35 Bus. LAW. 1083 (1980).
121. They can levy on it, if they have judgments against the seller. U.C.C. § 6-111
comment 2 (1987).
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Strangely, on the facts of McBee, the buyer and the seller
were, in a sense, one person, or at least they were jointly and severably liable on the seller's security agreement with SP1• The
security agreement was in fact signed by B, who represented herself as the partner of S. As a result, B was personally bound on the
after-acquired property clause in the loan agreement. Therefore, it
was proper to give SP1 priority over SP3 for the inventory acquired
by B after the bulk sale. SP1's security interest did attach to this
inventory. 122
This fact justifies giving post-sale inventory to SP1• It does not
justify giving post-sale inventory to SP2, who did not obtain B's
signature on its loan agreement. Properly speaking, the Fifth Circuit should have found a way to vindicate SP/s seniority to the
post-sale inventory while preventing SP2 from getting this
inventory.
One such theory-marshaling of assets-must be ruled out. If
inventory can be identified-divided into definite pre-sale and
post-sale amounts-then SP1 would have a senior security interest
in both pools of inventory, whereas SP2 would have a security interest in only one. This is a classic marshaling-of-assets situation,
except that ·SP3 can make the same argument! That is, SP1 has a
senior security interest in two pools of inventory, while SP3 is junior to a single pool. One of the rules of marshaling is that it must
not cause unfair prejudice to third parties. 123 Therefore, SP2 and
SP3 have identical and conflicting marshaling-of-assets claims
which cancel each other out.
If the inventory is perfectly identifiable, another possibility
now exists. Recall that SP2 was a purchase money lender as to part
of the inventory. 124 If this inventory (or its proceeds) could be
identified, then SP2 would be senior as to it over SP1• If this were
true in sufficient magnitude, then the marshaling impasse just described could be avoided. Instead, SP2 would be senior to at least
part of the pre-sale inventory. SP1 would take the balance of this.
To the remainder left to SP1 we could freely add post-sale inventory without giving any of this collateral to SP2• SP3 could then
have the residue of post-sale inventory after SP2 is paid out. If this
122. See supra note 21.
123. Averch & Prostok, The Doctrine of Marshaling: An Anachronistic Concept
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 22 U.C.C. L.J. 224, 231 (1990).
124. See supra note 21.
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line of reasoning had been followed, then Judge Williams's analysis
regarding post-sale inventory would have been on the money. He
could have given SP1 priority over SP3 without having any postsale inventory go to SP2•
·
Of course, whether the inventory was identifiable with this degree of accuracy is not known. If not, then application of the
commingling priority in section 9-315 becomes relevant. This subject will be taken up presently.

b. Bulk Transfers Between Corporate Subsidiaries.-McBee
is not the only case that dissolves the buyer-seller distinction.
Courts have strained to do so especially when ·one corporate subsidiary transfers a business to another corporate subsidiary. In
such cases, the bulk transfer may he completely invisible to the
naked eye. 125 The key in such cases is to find a theory whereby the
after-acquired property clause executed by the seller will be binding on the buyer. The theories developed to achieve this limited
"piercing the corporate veil" have not always been very sound, as
the McBee opinion has already demonstrated 1 A better theory
needs to be found.
There has developed a standard string-cite for the proposition
that the security agreement of S is binding on B. Yet it can be
shown that this string-cite is a total bootstrap, if I may mix a few
metaphors. The first case to hold B on a security interest she did
not sign is said to be Ryan v. Rolland. 126 This case turned only on
whether the financing statement covering pre-sale inventory was
still good to perfect the security interest in that inventory after the
125. Certain intra-corporate transfers are exempt from compliance with Article 6:
A transfer to a new business enterprise organized to.take over and continue the busi- ·
ness, if public notice of the transaction is given and the new enterprise assumes the
debts of the transferor and he receives nothing from the transaction except an interest in the new e~terprise junior to the claims of creditors[, is not subject to Article 6].
u'.c.C. § 6-103(7) (1987) (emphasis added). In the transfers we are dealing with, notice is
rarely given and the debts of the seller are not assumed by the buyer. Hence, Article 6 will
generally apply.
126. 434 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1970); see Towers v. B.J. Holmes Sales Co. (In re West
Coast Food Sales, Inc.), 637 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1981); Fliegel v. Associates Capital Co., 272
Or. 434, 537 P.2d 1144 (1975).
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sale. The court held that it was. 127 There was no dissolution of the
buyer-seller distinction there, so far as I can tell. 128
The second case often cited for holding B to the security
agreement of S also fails to establish.that point. In Inter Mountain
Association of Credit Men v. Villager, Inc.,1 29 the secured party
lent to a corporation in exchange for a security interest in all of the
debtor corporation's inventory. Later, the debtor merged with
three other related corporations. After the surviving corporation
filed for bankruptcy, the court held the surviving corporation liable
ort the secured party's after-acquired property clause. 130 This part
of the case is unexceptional-it is well known that, in a merger, the
surviving corporation assumes the liabilities of the previous
corporations. 131
The first case that genuinely held B to S's security agreement
(without the aid of a merger) was Fliegel v. Associates Capital Co.
127. Ryan, 434 F.2d at 357.
128. See Burke, supra note 120, at 1089-90.
129. 527 P.2d 664 (Utah 1974).
130. Villager, 527 P.2d at 672.
131. See, e.g., White Motor Credit Corp. v. Euclid Nat'l Bank, 63 Ohio Misc. 7, 409
N.E.2d 1063 (Ct. Common Pleas 1978). The Villager court did innovate, however, in holding
that the after-acquired property clause. would be limited in scope to the inventory sold in
the specific stores that the predecessor corporation owned, even though the surviving corporation now owned many stores, and even though one of the security agreements binding the
debtor gave to the secured party "all present and future ... inventory wherever located."
Villager, 527 P.2d at 667, 672. The broad language of the security agreement would seem to
contradict such a restriction, but a careful reading of the case shows the secured party entered into a different security agreement with the predecessor for each different store of the
predecessor. This might lead to the view that the parties intended the after-acquired property clause to cover inventory related to that specific store (and no other). If this is what the
predecessor agreed to, it should also be the. extent of the surviving corporation obligation.
The case also. contains various muddled arguments. For instance, the court is worried
whether the secured party has purchase money status. It launches into a iengthy analysis of
the metaphysical notion of inventory security interests and adopts the controversial "entity"
theory, which was designed to save inventory security interests from vulnerability to voidable preference law. Id. at 668-70 (citing Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 232 (1965)). None of this was necessary in the slightest
to the issue at hand-whether the after-acquired property obligation of the predecessor corporation bound the surviving corporation. The court also mentions a clause from the
security agreement that any successor would be bound by it. Such contractual language is
relevant only if the court is prepared to say that the security agreement created a running
covenant on the inventory, such that whoever bought the inventory (in bulk, presumably)
was bound on the agreement, whether she agreed or not. Such an innovation is completely
unnecessary because the law of corporate merger makes the successor liable on all the predecessor's contracts.
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of Delaware, Inc. 132 .In this case, S was a partnership bound on a
security agreement with an after-acquired property clause on inventory. According to this security agreement, S promised that
"[a]ll obligations of [S] shall bind its successors and assigns." 133
Subsequently, S transferred inventory to B, a wholly owned corporation set up to take over the business. B then obtained post-sale
inventory (apparently through credit advanced by the secured
party). 134 The court simply cited Ryan and Villager (wrongly) for
the proposition that a seller's after-.acquired property clause is
binding on a buyer (at least in an intracorporate setting)," and then
proceeded to follow these "precedents."
Although the court previously emphasized its reliance on the
so-called precedents, it does add this language as if it were an after-thought:
In addition, further support for holding the corporation subject to
the defendant's security agreement is provided by the terms of the
security agreement itself which provides that "[a]ll obligations of
[S] shall bind its successors and assigns." Since it is stipulated that
'the newly-formed corporation was the "successor" of [S], it became
subject to [SP1's] security [agreement]. 13G

This language can be taken to create a kind of equitable servitude on inventory, whereby a bulk buyer becomes bound on the
after-acquired property clause of its seller.
The second genuine case in which B became bound on S's
agreement (without expressly consenting to it or without a merger)
was American Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. 0. & E., Inc. 136 In
this case, S granted two security interests on inventory, as to which
SP1 was senior and SP2 was junior. SP2 then declared default and
sold the business to B, a wholly owned subsidiary of SP2• B then
acquired new inventory and commingled it with the old. SP1 then
declared default and sought to repossess the old and the new inventory. B protested that the after-acquired property clause
132. 272 Or. 434, 537 P.2d 1144 (1975).
133. Fliegel, 537 P.2d at 1148.
134. Id. at 1145 ("It is stipulated that defendant had financed the purchase of all the
items· which were repossessed.").
135. Id. at 1148 (reading "security agreement" for "security interest" at the end of the
passage). Accord Q.T,, Inc. v. Thomas Russell & Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 433,
436 (E.D. Va. 1989).
136. 40 Colo. App. 306, 576 P.2d 566 (1978).
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between SP1 and S could not affect B's post-sale inventory. Citing
Villager and Fliegel, the court held that SPi's security agreement
with S was binding on B. 137 Thus, we see the start of a string:cite
that was bootstrapped out of nothing.
Next came Towers v. B.J. Holmes Sales Co. (In re West Coast
Food Sales, Inc.), 138 which involved only one secured party (SP)
who entered into a security agreement with S, doing business as B.
The security agreement "contained a 'successors and assigns'
clause purporting to bind 'any corporation or other business entity
to which the proprietorship's business might be transferred.' " 139 S
then conveyed the business to a new corporate entity, which also
bore the name "B.'' 140
In the bulk sale, B assumed all liabilities of S. 141 B then proceeded to borrow from SP as if S still owned the business. B went
bankrupt, and the trustee claimed that B was not liable on the
after-acquired , property clause that existed in the agreement between SP and S. Hence, the trustee argued that SP had no lien on
any post-sale collateral.
The Ninth Circuit (per Judge Ely) held for SP. Judge Ely
could have decided that SP's security interest was binding on B
because B assumed S's liabilities. 142 On the other hand, he could
have argued that the clause in S's security agreement binding sue137. American Heritage, 576 P.2d at 568. The American Heritage case is susceptible
to a narrower interpretation. In this case, the post-sale inventory was commingled by B with
pre-sale inventory. If commingling means that the property can no longer be identified, then
SP1 would have a perfected security interest on the whole pursuant to section 9-315(1). The
use of section 9-315(1) to establish SP1's security interest on post-sale inventory is a subject
taken up in the next part of this Article. For now, let it suffice that the opinion does not
really say that the old and new inventory were indistinguishable, and so this narrower interpretation depends upon this unmentioned fact.
138. 637 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1981).
139. West Coast Food Sales, 637 F.2d at 708.
140. SP filed a financing statement under the trade name B, which was not proper.
U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1987); but see National Bank of Tex. v. West Tex. Wholesale Supply Co.
(In re McBee), 714 F.2d 1316, 1323 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that filing under trade name is
adequate if no one is misled). Later, when S conveyed all assets to B, the filing error was
deemed automatically corrected.
141. "On April 1, 1973, a newly formed entity, West Coast Food Sales, Inc. (the corporation) succeeded to the assets and liabilities of West Coast Sales Company." West Coast
Food Sales, 637 F.2d at 708.
142. That is, B and S expressly agreed for the benefit of SP1 that B is bound by the
security agreement between Sand SP1• See Houchen v. First Nat'! Bank (In re Taylorville
Eisner Agency, Inc.), 445 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Ill. 1977) (where B assumed all liabilities, postsale inventory was treated as subject to SP 1's interest).
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cessors and assigns to the agreement was binding on B, who took
the assets with knowledge of this clause. This would have made the
security agreement into an equitable servitude on the property of
S, on which B, as a knowledgeable buyer, would have been liable,
whether it consented or not. 143 Instead, after intoning the nowstandard string-cite of authorities in which the corporate successor
was held liable on the predecessor's security agreement, he simply
announced that if SP's security agreement does not bind B for ·
post-sale collateral,
a debtor would be able to evade the obligations of a validly executed
security agreement by the simple expedient of an alteration in its
business structure. We conclude as a matter of law that the security
agreement executed by the proprietorship continued to be effective
as to the accounts receivable generated by the corporation after the
change in entity status. 144

Thus, like the other cases, Judge Ely states no theory for binding
B on S's security agreement, except that to rule otherwise would
be to sanction an abuse of the corporate form.
Finally, Bank of the West u. Commercial Credit Financial
Services, Inc., 145 is a most interesting example of dissolving the
buyer-seller distinction. In this case (as shown in Figure Six), B
and S were corporate siblings owned by a common parent. Pursuant to a factoring arrangement, S granted a security interest in
accounts receivable to SP1• SP2 was B's lender claiming a security
interest in after-acquired inventory and accounts. One day the
common parent took a beverage business away from S and "sold"
it to B. SP1 was unaware of the sale. The same personnel who had
worked for S pow worked for B.14 6 As a result, SP1 continued to
collect accounts for B, unaware (at least for a while) that B was a
143. One recent case assumes such clauses routinely create equitable servitudes on inventory and other personal property. Q.T., Inc. v. Thomas Russell & Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 433, 436 (E.D. Va. 1989).
144.

West Coast Food Sales, 637 F.2d at 709.

145. 655 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd, 852 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1988).
146. Even they were confused as to which subsidiary owned the beverage business.
Bank of the West v. Commercial Credit Fin. Servs., 852 F.2d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 1988).
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different entity from S. 147 In short, even after the bulk sale, SP1
had no way of ascertaining that the sale had even occurred. 148
147. Id. The opinions are not very clear on the relationship between SP 1 and S. According to the appellate opinion:
The factoring agreement provided that [SJ would assign its accounts to [SPiJ. [SPiJ
would then collect amounts due from account debtors; three days after collection,
[SP1] would remit to [SJ the amounts collected, less a 1 % commission, and less any
prior advances, plus interest. Advances were to be made on accounts which remained
uncollected 33 days following assignment. In the factoring agreement, [SJ granted
SP1 a security interest in its present and after-acquired accounts. In a separate security agreement to secure advances made to [SJ pending collection of accounts, [SJ also
granted [SP1J a security interest in [SJ's present and after-acquired inventory and
proceeds.
Id. at 1165. From the above, it would seem that, if ever S owed SP1 for advances, any given
account or piece of inventory was collateral. But SP1's exposure for the first thirty-three
days after an account was signed is unclear. From the above passage, it does not seem as if
new value was advanced at the time the account was initially assigned to SP1 for collection.
Judge Schwarzer describes the relationship this way: "The agreement provided that
[SP1J would purchase accounts from [SJ at a discount from their face value and then collect
the sums due from [S's] customers. After collection, [SP1] would remit to [SJ the discounted
amount less interest and a commission." Bank of the West, 655 F. Supp. at 811. So described, it seems as if SP1 was buying the accounts from S on credit and remitting the
discounted amount (i.e., the price of the account) to S when the account was collected. If
this is so, SP1 should not get interest and commissions. On the contrary, it is S who should
get interest. Alternatively, when Schwarzer said "purchase," he might have meant that SP1
took a security interest in the account in exchange for a loan. In such a case, SP1 might
remit all proceeds (less interest on the loan plus a commission), and S might pay down
principal on the side. That is, SP1 might have foregone its right to set off the amount of the
advance to S (but retained a right to set off interest and the commission).
Later Judge Schwarzer writes:
From January through September 1984, [SPiJ purchased beverage accounts from [SJ
with a face value· of $1,900;000, for which [SP1] paid $1,300,000.... [IJnvoices directed account debtors to pay [SP1] . . . . After collecting accounts and remitting
proceeds to [SJ, [SPiJ _retained only the amount it originally paid .[SJ for the accounts plus $60,000 in interest and commissions. The factoring agreement terminated
on October 15, 1984. After that date, [SP1] retained no further collections from account debtors, except to cover one October 31, 1984 interest payment.
Id. at 812 (citations omitted and emphasis added). Apparently, SP1 retained (not remitted)
the purchase price. This suggests that SP1 advanced cash for the accounts and characterized
the advance as the purchase price for the accounts. That is, SP was a buyer, not a lender.
Yet SP1 also obtained interest and commissions above this amount and then returned the
balance to S. Interest and commissions are inconsistent with SP1 being a buyer. Instead, it
sounds as if SP1 was a lender on accounts. As such, SP1 might retain the initial loan (which
Judge Schwarzer confusingly calls "the amount if originally paid" id.) plus interest and
commissions. Any surplus over the amount of SP1's loan, interest and commissions would be
returned to S.
Factors who buy accounts are treated for historical reasons as if they are secured parties. See 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 308 (1965).
148. Telephone Interview with Mark R. Reiff, Attorney at Lapidus & Reiff, San Francisco, California (December 20, 1989) (represented SP1 in the litigation).

Bulk Sales Under Article 9

1990]

773

••

Time----1

Tied for
first to
perfect

l

I

s

Sale of
business

B

-G

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ..!

-----

t

SP2

i

Tied for
first in time

Figure Six

Within a few months, SP/s factoring agreement with S terminated. 149 Therafter, SP2, claiming the post-sale accounts as its own
collateral, served SP1 with a writ of possession requiring SP1 to
hand over any accounts proceeds it still possessed. In addition, SP2
sued SP1 for converting its property. 160 SP1 resisted, claiming it
had priority as to the post-sale accounts.
149. This cancellation occurred within four months of the bulk sale. Bank of the .West,
655 F. Supp. at 816. Therefore, SP1's financing statement was still good to perfect a security
interest in the post-sale colla~eral, if and only if SP1 could show that its security interest
attached to such creditor. See U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1987) (if financing statement becomes seriously misleading, the financing statement is still good to perfect all pre-sale collateral and
will continue to perfect post-sale collateral for only four months after the sale).
150. The only property at issue were "accounts generated from the sale of the beverage business's inventory after the transfer of the beverage business from [SJ to [BJ." Bank
of the West, 852 F.2d at 1166 (emphasis in original).
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At the district court level, Judge Schwarzer avoided deciding
whether SPi's security interest ever attached to the post-sale accounts in question. 151 Instead, he simply noted that SP2 filed a
financing statement '(against B) earlier than did SP1 (who filed
against S). Applying the "first to file" rule, 152 Judge Schwarzer
awarded priority to SP2• But having done so, Judge Schwarzer
then snatched victory from the jaws of SP2• Although Schwarzer is
· vague on the exact transaction between B and SP1, it appears that
SP1 lent. funds to B in exchange for a security interest in accounts.153 According to Judge Schwarzer, if SP1 had not made this
loan, B would have collected the accounts. The proceeds from collection would have been used by B for working capital. SP2 would
never have received these proceeds. Therefore, Schwarzer reasoned, SP1's conversion did not proximately cause SP2's losses:
The appropriate measure of dan;i.ages is the loss proximately caused
by [SP1's] conversion. [SP2] is therefore entitled to recover only
those sums which were retained by [SP2] and not returned to the
beverage business. [SP2] may obtain that portion of the $60,000 in
interest and commissions collected by [SP1] for accounts factored
after [the bulk sale from S to B]. 154

Under this formulation, damages excluded the principal amount of
the loan and any proceeds remitted to B. It included only the cash
proceeds that SP1 still retained by way of commissions and interest, a .tiny amount compared with the bulk of the accounts. 155
Already this was a substantial victory for SP1.
151. Judge Schwarzer does discuss the different question of whether SPi's security
interest attached to pre-sale accounts of S. SP 2 argued that S never even owned the beverage business in question, so that SP1 did not even receive pre-sale collateral. Although
ownership of the beverage business was cloudy, Judge Schwarzer authorized S to use it as
collateral. Bank of the West, 655 F. Supp at 813. This finding was unnecessary, since the
collateral in dispute was all post-sale collateral. See Bank of the West, 852 F.2d at 1167
(also unnecessarily considering attachment as to pre-sale collateral).
152. u.c.c. § 9-312(5) (1987).
153. "Here, the funds advanced by [SP1] were used to operate the beverage business
and resulted in the creation of new accounts." Bank of the West, 655 F. Supp. at 819.
Whether SP1 was a lender, a buyer, or a debtor is discussed supra in note 147.
The sums lent by SP1 to B (in exchange for a security interest in specific accounts)
would constitute proceeds of SP2 's collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1987) (" 'Proceeds' includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of
collateral or proceeds.").
154. Bank of the West, 655 F. Supp. at 819.
155. There is substantial incoherence in Judge Schwarzer's solution. Judge Schwarzer
claims SP2 can have sums retained by SP1 and not remitted to B. Schwarzer characterizes
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SP2 appealed, but slid backwards into total defeat. Writing for
the Ninth Circuit, Judge David Thompson decided that SP1's security interest did attach to the post-sale accounts, and that SP1
had total priority over SP2•166 SP1 was therefore allowed to keep its
commissions.
In ruling for SP1, Judge Thompson zeroed in on the attachment issue. He thought the key issue was "whether [SPi] has any
interest in collateral acquired by [B] after the transfer. At first
blush, the answer is no." 167 But Judge Thompson thought section
9-402(7) demanded a different answer.
In its entirety, and with each sentence separately :numbered,
section 9-402(7) provides:
[1] A financing statement sufficiently shows the name of the debtor
if it gives the individual, partnership or corporate name of the
debtor, whether or not it adds other trade names or names of partners. [2] Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an
organization its name, identity or corporate structure that a filed fithese sums as $60,000 in interest and commissions. But if I am right that SP1 advanced
funds on accounts and repaid itself out of later collections, SP1 would have retained not
only interest and commissions but the principal amount of its loan. The order that SP1
surrender retained funds would produce far more than $60,000.
No restatement of this result is free of contradictions either. For example, Schwarzer
might respond to the above critique by saying that he was really trying to isolate proximately caused damages. Damages would exclude amounts that, if B had done the collecting,
B would have used in the ordinary course of its business. These amounts correspond to the
amount lent by SP1 to B. But this would be wrong. If B had done the collecting, B would
have collected not only what SP1 lent, but it would have collected the $60,000 in interest
and commission expense SP1 collected and retained. This too would have been used in B's
business, and SP2 would have sustained no proximately caused damage at all.
If the idea is to give SP2 $60,000 but to immunize SP1 from any further liability, Judge
Schwarzer would have to abandon his proximate causation theory and argue simply that
SP1 is not liable for any sum actually remitted to B. This would guarantee SP2 the $60,000
in retained interest and commissions, but it would also give SP2 proceeds equal to the principal amount of SP1's loan to B-a much larger sum. (The only part of the prpceeds
remitted to B would have been the profit-the difference between the amount collected and
SP1's total claim on the amount collected). To limit SP2 to SP1's interest and commissions,
Judge Schwarzer might try to argue that SP1 has a superior right of setoff for the principal
amount of the loan. But if SP1 .could set off principal, why could not it also set off interest
and commissions? If setoff rights are superior, they should be entirely superior of all of
SP1's claim. Furthermore, there could be no setoff here because the debts set off are not
mutual. B owes SP1, on the one hand, and SP1 owes cash proceeds to SP2 on the other. No
setoff is possible here. In short, Schwarzer's theory does not turn on what is remitted to B or
not, nor can it be justified on a theory of proximate causation.
156. Bank of the West, 852 F.2d at 1174-75.
157. Id. at 1168 (emphasis in original).
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nancing statement becomes seriously misleading, the filing is not
effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the
debtor more than four months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing statement is filed before the expiration of that time.
[3) A filed financing statement remains effective with respect to collateral transferred by the debtor even though the secured party
knows of or consents to the transfer. 158

This provision governs financing statements and whether they continue to perfect a security interest. In particular, the second
sentence says to SP1, "If the corporate structure changes, so that
people might be misled, you've got work to do. You have to get out
and file a new financing statement. Otherwise, y()ur security interest is unperfected on any after-acquired property obtained more
than four months after the change occurs." That is, the provision
imposes burdens only on SP1 and promises nothing of benefit.
Judge Thompson, however, turned this provision on its head
and made it into a kind of "piercing the corporate veil" idea. He
reasoned that, instead of placing extra burdens on SP 1, this provision could bind B on S's security agreement. His analysis deserves
a careful review.
Judge Thompson starts by worrying whether the second or
third sentence of section 9-402(7) ought to apply. Judge Thompson
noted that the third sentence applies in the case of transferred collateral, but the second sentence (with its four-month grace period
for financing statements) applies in the case of changes in corporate structure. 159 The trouble was that the bulk sale could be
characterized either as a transfer from S to B or as a mere change
in corporate structure. And thus, after playing Hamlet for a while,
Judge Thompson decided to characterize the bulk sale as a change
in corporate structure. 160
As I implied earlier, this choice should not have helped SP1•
At best, the second sentence would have forced SP1 to file a new
financing statement to perfect security interests in after-acquired
property-a useless endeavor unless SP1 could show that its security interests could attach to post-sale accounts. What SP1 needed
was an attachment theory, given the fact that B never signed an
158. u.c.c. § 9-402(7) (1987).
159. Bank of the West, 852 F.2d at 1168-70.
160. Id. at 1170.
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after-acquired property clause ·in favor of SP1•161 For this reason,
choosing between the second and third sentence of section 9-402(7)
was a waste of time, unless the second sentence supplied an attachment theory.
The theory adopted by Judge Thompson is barely discernible.
In his view, the bulk sale of Bank of the West was a form of de
facto merger. 162 I have italicized the relevant language so that you
don't miss it:
In summary, we hold that when [SJ transferred its assets to [BJ,
this was not a bona fide third party transfer of collateral within the
scope of the third sentence of section 9402(7). Rather, [SJ simply
changed its corporate structure. When the transferor shifts assets to
an affiliated company at the behest of their common parent company, and when the transaction has the same effect as a merger of
the transferor into the transferee with the trans/eree as the surviving corporation,· we cannot say that this is a simple transfer of
collateral. To hold otherwise would permit debtors to decide which
sentence of section 9402(.7) applies merely by choosing an advantageous formal arrangement for the desired transaction. Thus,
applying the second sentence of section 9402(7), we hold that
[SP1 's] security interest continued perfected in [and hence attached
to 163 ] those assets actually transferred to [BJ as well as those assets
acquired by [BJ during the four months following the ... transfer.
Because the only collateral at issue in this case consists of those accounts factored in the 3 ½ -month period between [the bulk sale] and
[the cancellation of the factoring agreement], we need not consider
whether the [S-B] transaction rendered [SP1's] filed financing statement seriously misleading. 164
161. And even if SP1 did have an attachment theory, all the post-sale collateral came
into existence within four months of the bulk sale. See supra note 149. As a result, SP1 had
an effective financing statement to cover the collateral in dispute, if an attachment theory
could be devised.
162. The de facto merger doctrine was developed to provide shareholder protection in
cases when corporate subterfuge might otherwise deny it. Later, it was used in products
liability cases, when a seller sold assets to a buyer and promptly dissolved. The idea of the
doctrine was· to explain why the buyer might be liable on the in personam liability of the
seller. See Note, Expanding the Products Liability of Successor Corporations, 27 HASTINGS
L.J. 1305, 1316-17 (1976).
163. See U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1987) ("A security interest is perfected when it has attached .... ").
164. Bank of the West, 852 F.2d at 1171 (emphasis added). Judge Thompson also
makes much of the West Coast Food Sales case as not permitting S to evade an afteracquired property clause by conveying the business to B. Id. at 1170-71. But this is an incomplete description of that case. As we have seen, there was a perfectly adequate theory to
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Although buried in some useless discourse about financing statements, the de facto merger theory genuinely explains how S's
security agreement might be binding on B. Of course, this theory
has nothing to do with the effectiveness of anyone's financing
statement. Discussing this matter under section 9-402(7) is therefore misleading. 165
There is still the matter of SP1's priority over SP2• It will be
recalled that at the district court level Judge Schwarzer applied
the "first to file" rule. Judge Thompson reversed on the principle
that the "first to file" rule does not apply when two debtors issued
separate security interests to competing secured parties. 166 According to Thompson, SP1 had complete priority over SP2 , even though
SP1 was the second to file. As applied to security interests on presale collateral for pre-sale advances, Judge Thompson would have
been right to suspend the "first to file" rule. On the other hand,
Bank of the West involved entirely post-sale collateral and, probably, post-sale advances. As a result, the court should have
developed a more complex priority, as the next section of this, Article will show.
c. Priorities When Competing Creditors Have Different
Debtors.-With regard to pre-sale property, the basic "first to file
or perfect" rule of section 9-312(5) does not necessarily apply when
there are two debtors. 167 A two-debtor problem resembles the situation portrayed in Figure Seven.
explain why SP1's security interest attached to post-sale assets; B had expressly assumed all
S's liabilities. Since that theory was not available in Bank of the West, the reliance on West
Coast Food Sales does not help in establishing the existence of a merger.
165. For a more recent case declaring a de facto merger (so that B is made liable on
S's security agreement), see Q.T., Inc. v. Thomas Russell & Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 433, 436 (E.D. Va. 1989).
166. Id. at 1171-73.
167. Judge Thompson has offered a doctrinal justification for the suspension of the
"first to file" rule in two-debtor cases, According to section 9-312(1), "The rules of priority
stated in other sections of this Part ... shall govern where applicable." U.C.C. § 9-312(1)
(1987). One such rule is section 9-306(2), which provides: "Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or
other disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party ...."
Id. § 9-306(2). The theory is that section 9-306(2) varies the "first to file" rule by providing
that the second debtor takes subject to the security interest of SP1, and that SP2 is likewise
limited. Bank of the West, 852 F.2d at 1174. This theory is compromised, however, by the
language of section 9-306(2): "{e]xcept where this Article otherwise provides . ... " U.C.C. §
9-306(2) (1987) (emphasis added). This language in section 9-306(2) refers us right back to
the "first to file" language, and so we are at an impasse.
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In Figure Seven, SP1 perfects a security interest and, after that,
the debtor sells the collateral out of the ordinary course of business
to B. B takes subject to SPi's already perfected security interest,
and SP2 (B's lender who has a right to after-acquired property) is
automatically junior, even if SP2 was the first to file.
When SP2 is the first to file, it must be true that SP1 prevails.
If not, a debtor could easily disencumber her assets by selling them
to a buyer with a venerable after-acquired lender. Meanwhile, no
amount of re~earch in the files could protect SP1 from this risk. 168
In contrast, where a single debtor grants security interests to
both SP1 and SP2, the "first to file or perfect" rule allows SP1 to
do the research necessary to protect herself. Although SP1 is "first
in time" in a property transfer sense, SP1 could search the records
168. Steven Harris adds this rationale for the rule: "SP2 had no interest in the goods
and could not possibly have been disadvantaged by a secret security interest in favor of
SP1." Harris, supra note 1, at 22.3. While this is true much of the time, it is not so universal
as Harris suggests. One justification for pre-attachment filing is so that a secured party can
know that she will always be senior with regard to any specific types of collateral. The suspension of the "first to file or perfect" rule might defeat that expectation and therefore
prejudice SP2•
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to see that SP2 has already filed and accordingly has priority. 169
This is shown in Figure Eight:
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a financing
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against Debtor

SP1 files
a financing
statement against
Debtor
Figure Eight

In Figure Eight, if SP1 checks the filing records under the debtor's
name, she will find SP2's financing statement and can react accordingly. Not so when there are sequential debtors, as in Figure
Seven. 170
These jdeas have been well developed in· the work of Barkley
Clark, 171 Steven Harris,1 72 and others. But Judge Thompson was
nevertheless wrong to apply these thoughts to post-s~le property in
light of his theory that B and S had entered into a de facto merger.
i. De Facto Mergers, Post-Merger Property, and Future Advances.-In Bank of the West,1 73 Judge Thompson needed an
169. Id. at 224.
170. The "first to file or perfect" rule does apply in some two-debtor cases, however.
Specifically, it occurs when the first debtor sells to the second before SP1 perfects. The
buyer must have knowledge of the unperfected security interest. See infra text accompanying notes 267-74. Alternatively, the buyer might have no knowledge but be subordinated for
having violated the rules of Article 6.. Harris, supra note 1, at 203-11; see infra text accompanying notes 268-78.
171. B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 3.8[4] (1980).
172. Harris, supra note 1, at 224-26.
173. 852 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1988).
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attachment theory-a th~ory to explain why a security agreement
signed by Sand SP 1 would be binding on B, so that post-sale property acquired by B would be encumbered by SP1's security
interest. His solution was to declare the existence of a de facto
merger between S and B. On top of this, Judge Thompson suspended the "first to file" rule and gave SP1 priority, even though
SP2 had filed years before SP1•
If this case had involved pre-sale collateral and pre-sale advances, this solution would have been unassailable. A merger
should be treated just like a sale, with regard to pre-merger property. That is, the "first to file" rule should be suspended, and each
secured party should be protected for. the pre-merger collateral
each separately claims.
But this solution seems inappropriate for post-sale· or postmerger collateral. In such a case, each party attaches and perfects
a security interest in the collateral at precisely the same time. It
was arbitrary for Judge Thompson to favor the second to file over
the first to file, with regard to post-merger collateral. Yet it would
have been just as arbitrary to favor the first to file. In the case of a
merger, neither side could have protected itself by searching the
records of possible merger partners.
A better solution is for the two competing secured parties to
share pro rata by analogy to the commingling statute. 174 This pari
·passu rule would displace the "first to file" rule, but it would be
consistent with the principle of "first in time is first in right." That
is, these security interests both attached and perfected at the same
time. There is no strong reason to subordinate one party to another, and so pro rata sharing seems appropriate. 175 Pari passu
priority is justified because each party obtained perfected security
174. There is a certain economy of word play here, because while the collateral remains discrete and identifiable, the debtors commingle themselv~s. ·
175. One problem caused by pro rata priorities is that, in a foreclosure sale, neither
security interest is senior to the other, and so it is impossible for one to foreclose the other.
See U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (1987) (foreclosure discharges the security interest from being enforced, plus "any security interest or lien subordinate thereto"). This creates a "reverse
prisoner's dilemma," where the first secured party to proceed loses value to the secured
party who does nothing. Suppose, for example, that SP1 and SP2 each claims $1,000, and
the post-merger collateral is worth $1,500. Suppose further that they are awarded an equal
priority. SP1 elects to foreclose. A buyer would obtain the collateral subject to the other
unforeclosed lien and so would pay $500. Later, SP2 can foreclose at her leisure and take the
full $1,000. Thus, SP1 was the first to proceed and therefore received only $500. Yet this was
precisely what SP1 would have received if it had been completely junior. Each secured
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interests simultaneously, and the "first to file" rule has been suspended in double-debtor cases.
This pari passu suggestion for post-merger collateral can only
apply to pre-merger advances or pre-merger commitments to lend
by SP1• If, after the merger, SP1 voluntarily advances funds to B
(with knowledge of the merger), then; in effect, a single debtor (B)
will have granted security interests to two secured parties. Accordingly, the "first to file" rule applies once again, and SP2 wins
completely, having been the first to file. 176
In Bank of the West, the opinions do not specify when the
advances were given. It appears likely, however, that SP1 made advances only after an account came into existence. If these were
discretionary advances (not pursuant to a pre-merger commitment), then Judge Thompson should have applied the "first to
file" rule after all. 177 But there remains this consideration: SP1 did
not even know the merger had taken place. SP1 thought it was
making advances to S on collateral owned by S.
It might be possible to apply the rule of section 9-307(3). According to this section:
A buyer other than a buyer in ordinary course of business ... takes
free of a security interest to the extent that it secures future advances made after the secured party acquires knowledge of the
purchase, or more than 45 days after the purchase, whichever first
occurs, unless Dlade pursuant to a commitment entered into without
party, then, has an incentive to do nothing. The second best option is to cooperate and
foreclose together. Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment, supra note 32, at 520-525.
If these security interests are foreclosed in bankruptcy, the reverse prisoner's dilemma
can be avoided because the bankruptcy trustee can sell free of liens and simply divide the
proceeds pro rata. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3) (1988).
· 176. Accord White Motor Credit Corp. v. Euclid Nat'! Bank, 63 Ohio Misc. 7, 409
N.E.2d 1063 (Ct. Common Pleas 1978) ("first to file" rule applied as between SP1 , whose
security agreement was with S, and SP2 , whose security agreement was with the post-merger
entity).
177. If it were not for the merger theory, we would have to add that advances to B are
not secured by any collateral, unless a written security agreement exists. See U.C.C. § 9203(1)(a) (1987) ("a security interest ... does not attach unless ... the collateral is in the
possession of the secured party pursuant to agreement, or the debtor has signed a security
agreement"). Unless B is bound on S's agreement (by virtue of having merged with S), then
SP1 must produce a security agreement that B has signed. It is often said, however, that
reliance by a promissee takes a contract out of the statute of frauds. Here, SP1 would have
relied on B's promise by advancing funds, thereby making a written agreement unnecessary.

1990]

Bulk Sales Under Article 9

783

knowledge of .the purchase and before the expiration of the 45 day
period. 178

Under section 9-307(3), any advances made pursuant to a pre-sale
commitment to lend are senior to a buyer's interest in the collateral actually bought. In addition, SP1 (if without knowledge of the
sale) had a forty-five day privilege to make discretionary senior advances to S (not B). If discretionary advances (to S) are made
within this period, they are treated like pre-sale advances. After
that, all discretionary advances by SP1 are junior to the buyer's
interest in the collateral actually bought.
The de facto merger theory of Judge Thompson threatens the
use of this provision because the advances were not to S but to a
merged S-B. In other words, S has ceased to exist, and has been
replaced by a sublated new entity. But since this new entity preserves the attributes of S,1 79 perhaps we can say that advances to
the S-B combination are legally the same as advances to S. As
such, any committed advances and any discretionary advances
made within forty-five days of the merger by an ignorant SP1 are
entitled to some kind of priority. 180
·
·
·
But recall that the collateral in question was post-merger collateral. As to this collateral (obtained by S-B), the "first-to-file"
rule is suspended. Instead, we substitute a "first-to-perfect" rule.
Whoever between SP1 and SP2 was the first to perfect should have
priority. If they are tied, they should share pro rata priority.
In Bank of the West, it is hard to tell whether SP1 had committed to make advances (prior to the merger), or whether it had
discretion to advance every time an account was tendered to
SP1•181 If SP1 was committed to advance funds on proffered ac178. u.c.c. § 9-307(3) (1987).
179. According to Hegel (our leading philosopher of mergers and acquisitions):
What is sublated [i.e., merged] is not ... reduced to nothing ... it is a non-being ...
which had its origin in a being. It still has, therefore, in itself the determinateness
from which it orginates. "To sublate" has a twofold meaning in the language: on the
one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to
cease, to put an end to.
G. HEGEL, THE SCIENCE OF Lome 107 (A.V. Miller trans. 1969) (emphasis in original),
180. In other words, we are equating mergers and sales for the purpose of applying
section 9-307(3).
181. Judge Thompson writes: "Advances were to be made on accounts which remained
uncollected 33 days following assignments." Bank of the West, 852 F.2d at 1165 (emphasis
added). Judge Schwarzer writes: "The agreement provided that [SP1] would purchase accounts from [SJ . . . ." Bank of the West, 655 F. Supp at 811. He also hints that the
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counts, then all of its advances should have been treated as premerger advances. If such was the case, SP1 and SP2 perfected security interests in post-merger accounts at the same time. Since
the "first to file" rule is suspended, SP1 and SP2 should share the
collateral pro rata.
If, on the other hand, SP1 had discretion to lend or not, all
discretionary advances for the first forty-five days must be treated
as pre-merger advances, to the extent that SP 1 had no knowledge
of the merger. 182 These initial protected advances should generate
for SP1 a pro rata share of post-merger property. After the privilege in section 9-307(3) lapses, SPi's discretionary advances to B
should be subordinated to SP2's claims. Now a common debtor has
created the security interests of both SP 1 and SP2: Hence, the
"first to file" rule is reinstated. Under this rule, SP2 is senior to
SP1• Thus, if all advances are discretionary, .the post-merger advances falling under section 9-307(3) will be entitled to a pro rata
priority, and all others will be junior.
ii. Other Atta.chment Theories.-De facto merger is not the
only attachment theory that Judge Thompson could have adopted
to. show how SP 1 might claim post-merger property, but none of
the other possibilities succeeds in producing a better priority for
SP 1• For instance, McBee established the principle that noncomplying bulk transferees are personally liable on the security
agreements of S. 183 This theory-based upon a strange notion that
"ineffective transfers" mean that the buyer .and the seller are
merged as the same person-has already been criticized. 184 Possibly, this theory is the same one which prevailed in the Bank of the
West appeal. In any case, at best it supports pro rata sharing between SP1 and SP2•185
factoring agreement came to a natural end, i.e., that SP1 did not use its discretion to end it.
Id. at 812 ("The factoring agreement terminated on October 15, 1984."). For a discussion of
what constitutes a "commitment to lend," see U.C.C. § 9-105(k); Carlson and Shupack, Part
I, supra note 42, at 368-70.
182. U.C.C. § 9-307(3) (1987). There is no finding on this question in the reported
opinions, but SP1 did claim to be a holder in due course of checks received from account
debtors. Such a claim would involve the assertion that SP1 knew nothing of the merger.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 109-24.
184. Id.
185. Judge Schwarzer ruled that Article 6 did not apply because SP1 claimed "accounts," and Article 6 covers only "inventory" (plus auxiliary equipment). Bank of the
West, 655 F. Supp. at 816; see also U.C.C. § 6-102(1),(2) (1987). This holding is correct,
insofar as it applied to SP1's claims to the accounts, but it should be remembered that S
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A second theory is that, after the sale, B simply assigned accounts to SP1-one at a time. That is, even if S's security
agreement did not cover these accounts, B's agents independently
assigned the accounts to SP1• This theory has a flaw, however. According to UCC section 9-203(1)(a), B must sign the security
agreement. In Bank of the West, only S signed. Some method
must be found to satisfy this signature requirement. Even if this
impediment could be overcome, this attachment theory subordinates SP1 to BP2 because SP2 clearly has priority under the "first
to file" rule. 186 Whereas, before, Judge Thompson could claim
(wrongly in my view) that the "first to file" rule is suspended in
double-debtor cases, now it must be admitted that SP1 and SP2
have the same debtor, B, so that the "first to file" rule would
clearly apply.
A third theory might be that B implicitly consented to liability
on S's security agreement. If so, then SPi's security interest attached to post-sale inventory by virtue of the after-acquired
property clause in S's security agreement. This theory requires
some evidence of B's consent, and just as important, some way
must be found to evade the requirement that B sign the security
agreement. 187 Even if this is possible, SP1 and SP2 would have had
a single debtor, so that the "first-to-file'; rule applies to
subordinate SP1•
A fourth theory might hold that, even if B did not consent
implicitly, Bis stuck with S's security agreement because the business assets were encumbered by an equitable servitude making the
possessor of business assets liable on the obligations Qf the seller.
also transferred inventory, and SP1 had a perfected security interest in that inventory.
Whereas Article 6 would not permit SP 1 to claim a property interest against accounts, SP1
might have been a creditor of S. (This is uncertain, see supra note 147). As such, SP1 would
have had rights against the inventory that S transferred to B.
A second idea of Schwarzer was that SP2 seemed to be a bona fide purchaser for value
of inventory and equipment by virtue of its after-acquired property clause in the security
agreement with B. Bank of the West, 655 F. Supp, at 816. (No evidence was presented on
what SP2 knew of the bulk sale). Such a status would cut off SP1 from any claim on inventory. U.C.C. § 6-110 (1987). However, it would have no effect on SP1's claims to accounts,
which Judge Schwarzer thought unaffected by Article 6.
On appeal, Judge Thompson seemed to assume that Article 6 did apply. Bank of the
West, 852 F.2d at 1170 n.6. As a result, B could not claim to have cut off SP1's security
interest under section 9-307(1) at the time of the bulk sale.
186. u.c.c. § 9-.312(5) (1987).
187. Id. § 9-201(l)(a).
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Such a theory is fanciful, but recall this is a California case. In
California, equitable servitudes spring up in the darnedest places.
Thus, in Ray v. Alad Corp., 188 also a case involving intracorporate
transfers, B never agreed to assume the products liability of S.
When a person was injured after the bulk sale, he sued B and won,
because the obligation to pay for such torts "ran" with the factory.
It is not so great an extension to apply this principle to security
agreements. 189 Such a theory does not supply SP1 with priority in
Bank of the West, however. If B became bound on the servitude
when it "bought" the beverage business, then, B has agreed .to encumber its after-acquired property for the first time .. Since both
SP 1 and SP2 have a common debtor, the "first-to-file" rule of section 9-312(5) applies, which subordinates SP 1 to SP2•100
One theory that would not work to establish attachment of
SP/s security interest on B's post-merger property is that S made
a fraudulent conveyance to B thereby reviving the after-acquired
property clause against B. Fraudulent conveyance law gives in rem
rights in B's property. 191 . SP1 needs a theory that establishes B's in
personam obligation on the security agreement of S. In any case,
SP2 would have been a bona fide purchaser for value who takes
free of any in rem right created by fraudulent conveyance law. 192
Nor is it clear that fraudulent conveyance law could encumber
post-merger property.
188. 19 Cal. 3d 2~, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977); For comparsion of Ray v.
Alad to equitable servitudes, see Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of Iniertemporal Creditor Priorities Created by Running Covenants, Products
Liability, and Toxic Waste Cleanup, 50 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 119 (1987). For a history
of this development in the law of products liability, see Note, supra note 162.
189. For cases expressly approving of the equitable servitude idea, see Q.T., Inc. v.
Thomas Russell & Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 433, 436 (E.D. Va. 1989); Fliegel v.
Associates Capitol Co. of Delaware, Inc., 537 P. 2d 1144, 1147 (1975). These cases involved
express contractual language creating the servitude, whereas Alad Corp. does not.
190. One commentator thinks that the entire line of cases analyzed in the text is a
category mistake: "A few courts have regarded the transfer of items of inventory as somehow tantamount to a transfer of the category, such that items later acquired by the
transferee independent of the transferor debtor have been held to fall within. the inventory
clause of the original security agreement." Knippenberg, Debtor Name Changes and Collateral Transfer Under 9-402(7): Drafting From the Outside-In, 52 Mo. L. REV. 57, 107-08
(1987) (footnote omitted).
191. See Note, supra note 38.
192. This is. what Judge Schwarzer ruled. Bank of the West v. Commerical Credit Fin.
Servs., 655 F. Supp. 807, 816 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 852 F.2d 1162 (9th
Cir. 1988).
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m. How Bank of the West Should Have Been Decided.-Since the reasoning in Bank of the West has sustained
heavy damage, it might be useful to describe how I think the case
should have been decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
First, SPi's case depends entirely on whether it can prove a
theory of attachment. Special emphasis should be put on the fact
that SP1 acted honestly in thinking that it had advanced funds to
S pursuant to its factoring agreement, instead of advancing funds
to B, with whom it had rio agreement. Judge Thompson's de facto
merger theory does provide an attachment theory that provides
SP1 with something better than a totally subordinated position.
Accordingly, I would agree that B and S are to be treated as
merged. This ruling has nothing to do with section 9-402(7), however, which simply governs the effectiveness of SP1's financing
statement. Instead, the de facto merger doctrine would be adapted
from California's free-wheeling tort law.
Having ruled that SP1's security interest attached to the postsale accounts of B, I would then reverse and remand the case on
the strength of a theory that Judge Schwarzer completely rejected.
The best theory for SP1 is that it was a holder in due course of
checks from the account debtors and therefore took free of SP2 's
senior security interest.
Invariably, when SP1 obtained payment of an account, the account debtor wrote SP 1 a check, or the account debtor wrote B a
check which was negotiated over to SP1 . 193 These checks were proceeds of the accounts. Accordingly, SP2 had a valid security
interest in these checks, but if SP1 took the checks as a holder in
due course, it took free of SP2's security interest. 194 This is a risk
that receivables lenders face routinely. According to Professor Paul
Shupack:
When a secured lender relies on priority rights to after-acquired intangibles, her expectations may be defeated by making those rights
tangible and then having the tangible version of those rights acquired by a good faith purchaser. If, for example, a lender relies on a
pool of continuously renewing accounts receivable, a debtor could
defeat the creditor's interest by having his customers embody their
obligations in negotiable instruments. The debtor could then sell
193. Id. at 812.
194. U.C.C. § 3-305(1) (1987) ("To the extent that a holder is a holder in due ·course
he takes the instrument free from (1) all claims to it on the part of any person .... ").
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these instruments to a person who qualifies as a holder in due
course, leaving the original secured creditor without assets she legitimately expected to be available to her .1911

Judge Schwarzer rejected this theory on inadequate grounds. He
thought that SP2 was not claiming an interest in the checks themselves. Instead, SP2 was claiming accounts. Accordingly, it was the
assignment of accounts by B to SP1 that was the act of conversion.
Therefore, a later liquidation of the accounts into checks was irrelevant, and so was the claim that SP1 was a holder in due course of
those checks. This argument is founded on an erroneous premise.
The sale of accounts cannot be an act of conversion. Article 9 specifically authorizes the transfer of debtor equity in collateral. 196 In
light of this authorization, it takes a greater interference with
SP/s rights to constitute the act of conversion. 197
Because the assignment of accounts cannot have been the act
of conversion, and because SP2's security interest continued to encumber the accounts after the assignment, SP2 did indeed claim a
property right to the checks themselves. These checks were proceeds of the accounts. If SP1 were a holder in due course,1 98 then
SP1 would take free of property claims of third parties, such as
SP2.1ee

The worst result in commercial law is when ordinary account
debtors are made to pay twice. There is no danger of that here.
According to section 9-318(3), "The account debtor is authorized
to pay the assignor until the account debtor receives notification
that the amount due ... has been assigned ...." 200 This provision
would allow the account debtor to pay SP1 until SP2 notified the
account debtor of its senior security interest. Although SP1 is not
the assignor, SP1 took by assignment everything the assignor (B)
195. Shupack, Defending Purchase Money Security Interests Under Article 9 of the
UCC From Professor Buckley, 22 IND. L. REV. 777, 788 (1989).
196. u.c.c. § 9-311 (1987).
197. See Nickles, Enforcing Article 9 Security Interests Against Subordinate Buyers
of Collateral, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511, 526 (1982).
198. Because Judge Schwarzer thought it impossible for SP1 to be a holder in due
course, he declined to find whether SP1 was without notice. Bank of the West, 655 F. Supp.
at 820 n.9.
199. U.C.C. § 3-305(1) (1987); see id. § 9-309 ("Nothing in this Article limits the rights
of a holder in due course ... [and] [f]iling under this Article does not constitute notice of
the security interest to such holders or purchasers.").
200. Id. § 9-318(3).
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had, including the power in section 9-318(3) to double-deal senior
assignees by demanding payment from account debtors before they
hear of the senior assignment. 201 Hence, the account debtors were
authorized to pay SP1• Furthermore, as a holder in due course, SP1
has no liability· for receiving this payment.
Bank of the West therefore should have been remanded to determine the extent to which SP1 was a holder in due course of each
check it received. For every such check, SP2's conversion claim is
defeated. 202
201. Compare supra note 170 (describing how junior buyers inherit the debtor's power
to double-deal senior unperfected secured parties).
. 202. I have implied in the text that SP1 needs an attachment theory in order to be a
holder in due course. Behind this claim lies ·some difficult and tenuous analysis.
Suppose the de facto merger theory is rejected. The other theories, see supra text accompanying notes 183-92, fail to establish that B signed a security agreement in favor of
SP1, as required by section 9-203(1)(a) (''a security interest is not enforceable against the
debtor or third parties . .. unless ... the debtor has signed a security agreement.") (emphasis added). Without a security agreement signed by B, SP1 is neither a purchaser of
accounts nor the owner of an unperfected security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (1987)
("this Article applies ... (b) to any sale of accounts"). As a result, SP1 never took a security
interest in any account. Or, to say it another way, B never sold or otherwise transferred any
accou_nts to SP1• Yet SP1 is the holder of checks made out to it by B's account debtors.
-Putting these two legal conclusions together, it appears that SP1 has not given value
and is not a holder in due course. U.C.C. § 3-302(1)(a) (1987). Instead, SP1 has made an
unsecured loan to B, but this loan is utterly unconnected to its receipt of the check. That is,
SP1 is, at best, a collection agent for B, and a lender to B, but collection and the unsecured
loan must be unrelated and unconnected, if we are to give effect to the premise that no
effective assignment of accoun~s by B to SP1 took place for lack of B's signature on a security agreement. "Value," for the purposes of being a holder in due cours.e, is defined in
section 3-303: If SP1 has an attachment theory, it is easy to find that Si\ took the checks
for value. Section 3-303 says that value exists when SP1 has a security interest in the instrument. Given attachment _of a security interest ·in accounts, SP1 would have a security
interest in the checks because the checks are proceeds of the accounts that SP1, by hypothesis, would own. But if there is no attachment theory, the only language in this definition
that could be relevant to SP1 is section 3-303(b), which provides that "[a) holder takes the
instrument for value ... (b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security for
an antecedent claim against any person .... " This language, though, cannot describe SP1
unless one also adds an attachment theory. The checks from the account debtors are in
payment of an antecedent claim owned by B, but section 3-303(b) seems to require that SP,
own the antecedent claim· which is paid. Otherwise, collecting agents would routinely be
holders in due course, which is not the case. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 622-27 (3d ed. 1988).
In the absence of an attachment theory,.SP1 has one remaining argument: Article 9
(with its signature requirement) does not even cover this transaction. According to section
9-104(f), Article 9 does not apply
to a sale of accounts ... as part of a sale of the business out of which they arose, or
an assignment of accounts ... which is for the purpose of collection only, or a transfer
of a right to payment under a contract to an assignee who is also to do the perform-
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In case SP1 is not a holder in due course, further consideration
of the priorities is necessary. The next point I would make is that
the case should have been remanded for a determination of
whether any of SPi's claim comes from advances or commitments
made before the merger. There is a good chance that all of its
claim is·pursuant to a pre-merger commitment to lend. Even if the
advances were discretionary, it is still possible that some of the
advances pre-date the merger.
Let us suppose that some or all of the claims are pre-merger
claims. The first thing that needs to be done is to investigate SP1's
claim to inventory. If any pre-merger inventory still existed at the
time of SP2's lawsuit, this should have been awarded to SP1 on the
strength of pre-merger advances, even though• SP2 filed first. 203
This is because the "first to file" rule is suspended in two-debtor
cases. Instead, we apply the "first to perfect" rule. As to old inventory, SP1 clearly perfected first to the extent SP1 gave pre-merger
ance under the contract or a transfer of a single account to an assignee in whole or
partial satisfaction of a preexisting indebtedness . . . .
We have said that SP1 is a mere collection agent, in the absence of an attachment theory,
and section 9-104(0 does exempt collection agents form Article 9. SP1 might hope that it
can tak~ a common-law assignment for the purpose of collection, and then, as. an unsecured
creditor of B, SP1 might retain the collection by way of setoff against the unsecured loan it
has made to B. If the common law of assignments applies, the statute of frauds might require a writing, but not B's signature. In Bank of the West, there was.a writing; it was the
security agreement between Sand SP1• If Article 9 does not apply, then SP1 could claim to
be the owner of accounts under the common-law doctrine of assignment.
If so, then SP1 is a holder who takes "the instrument in payment of ... an antecedent
claim against any person." U.C.C. § 3-303(b) (1987). That is, SP1 has taken the account
debtors' checks in order to create a setoff against B. See U.C.C. § 9-104(i) (1987) (setoffs
not covered by Article 9). But this doesn't quite work. Section 3-303(b) requires the checks
to be in payment of B's obligation to SP1• Here, SP1 is collecting checks for B, but they do
not "pay" SP1 's claim against B. Instead, the manifestation of a later setoff is the payment.
Hence, the use of section 9-104(f) does not show that SP1 took the checks for value.
Nor can SP1 claim that it took assignments of accounts in satisfaction of an antecedent
claim by SP1 against B. The facts of Bank of the West probably are that, first, the account
came into existence, and then it was assigned to SP, in exchange for an advance. Also, it is
unlikely that the assignment is in satisfaction of antecedent debt. Rather, it appears that
the accounts are security for B's obligation to pay back loans.
If I am right, SP1 needs an attachment theory to be a holder in due course of the checks
received from the account debtors of B. A de facto merger is a convenient theory because it
explains how B signed a security agreement. Under this theory, B becomes S. Since S signed
the security agreement, B signed it too (through merger theory). By this means the requirements of section 9-203(1)(a) would be met.
203. Judge Thompson recognized this in his opinion. Bank of the West v. Commerical
Credit Fin. Servs., 852 F.2d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 1988).
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value. Now this inventory is not at issue in the lawsuit by SP2 for
conversion of accounts. Nevertheless, this determination must be
made in anticipation of the point that SP1 must be given a chance
to trace pre-merger inventory and pre-merger accounts into postmerger accounts. If this can be done, SP1 obtains complete priority
for any traceable amounts.
A different priority exists for post-merger accounts that cannot be traced to SPi's pre-merger collateral. If SP1 had any premerger claims or if it had made post-merger advances pursuant to
a pre-merger commitment to lend, SP1 and SP2 must share the
leftover disputed collateral on a pro rata basis?04 Since SP1 has
retained $60,000 in interest and commissions plus the principal
amounts of any loans, SP1 could conceivably have some conversion
liability· to SP2 on this proposition, although it will depend on how
successful SP1 was in showing itself to be a holder in due course of
checks or in tracing inventory into accounts and how large the
claim of each secured party is.
Finally, if SP1 gave discretionary advances after the merger,
these advances are treated like pre-merger advances to the extent
they can be brought under section 9-307(3). Thus, on remand, it
could be necessary to determine when SP1 became knowledgeable
of the sale of the beverage business to B. If SP1 remained ignorant
of the sale for more than forty-five days, then any discretionary
advances forty-five days after the de facto merger are to be treated
as pre-merger advances. 2011 That is, these advances will generate for
SP1 a pro rata share of post-merger collateral. If SP~ obtained this
knowledge earlier than forty-five days, then only advances made
prior to gaining this knowledge will be treated as pre-merger advances. Any advances failing to come under the section 9-307(3)
umbrella will not enjoy pro rata priority with SP2's claims and instead will be entirely subordinated.

204. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
205. Of course, if SP1 had no knowledge of the merger for forty-five days, it was probably a· holder in due course of checks from the account debtors, and so would have a better
priority than merely pari passu, as the use of section 9-307(3) would provide. See supra text
accompanying notes 193-202.
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2. Proceeds and Commingling Theory in McBee
For those who scorn the above fancy theories for dissolving the
seller into the buyer, there are two more pedigreed theories for establishing that SP 1 gets a security interest in inventory acquired
by B. First, if B took encumbered inventory and sold it, and then
took the cash proceeds and bought new inventory (a plausible result), . then the new inventory would be proceeds of the old
inventory. As such, the new inventory would belong to SP1•206 Second, if the old inventory were commingled with new inventory in
such a way that neither the new nor the ·old inventory could be
identified, then SP1 might be awarded a security interest under
UCC section 9-315, which pertains to security intere.sts in commingled goods. 207
· ·
·
·
•
.
These theories-particularly commingling-do not explain the
McBee case,208 unless there are additional facts beyond those disclosed in the published opinion. Neither Judge Williams of the
Fifth Circuit nor Bankruptcy Judge Elliott mentions whether the
proceeds of old .inventory went to buy new inventory, or whether
inventory was commingled. Indeed, the inventory (guns and weapons) is likely to be highly identifiable and hence it is unlikely that
McBee was a secret commingling case.
a. The Priority of SP3 (as Junior to SP1 and SP2 ).-Just in
case McBee was a secret commingling case, Professor Harris offers
us an interpretation. of section 9-315(2), which provides:
When under subsection (1) [of Section 9-315] more than one security interest attaches to the product or mass, they rank equally
according to the ratio that the cost of the goods to which each interest originally attached bears to the cost of the total product or
mass. 200

According to Harris, where SP1 and SP2 have security interests in
inventory sold by S to B, and where B commingles the inventory
with other property as to which SP1 and SP2 have no claim, and
where, subsequent to commingling, B then grants a security interest to SP3, then section 9-315(2) does not apply to make all these
206. Harris, supra note 1, at 231-33.
207. Id. at 233-36.
208. As Professor Harris recognizes. Id. at 236.
209. u.c.c. § 9-315(2) (1987).
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secured parties equal in priority. 210 Instead, SP1 and SP2 have priority over SP3• The exact order of events is crucial:
(1) SP1 and SP2 attach and perfect;
(2) S transfers inventory to B;
(3) B commingles collateral and noncollateral;
(4) B issues a junior security interest to SP3 •
If we switch the order around just a little:
(1) SP 1 and SP2 attach and perfect;
, (2) S transfers inventory to B;
(3) B issues a junior security interest to SP3 (on post-sale
inventory);
(4) B commingles the collateral of SP1 and SP2 with the collateral of SP3;
then section 9-315(2) applies and all secured parties are equal in
priority. 211 Pari passu priority follows because, now, each secured
party has a perfected security interest in uncommingled inventory
and has now contributed collateral to the whole. Before, SP3 had
not contributed its own collateral into the common pool, but simply took a junior security interest on the entire pool. Given the
former temporal order that actually existed in the McBee case,212 I
210. Harris states:
To avoid dealing with subsection (2) altogether, one can argue that [SP3]'s security
interest did not attach to the mass by virtue of commingling "under subsection (1),"
but rather by virtue of its security agreement under sections 9-201 and 9-203(1).
Under this approach, section 9-315(2) by its terms does not apply, and one must look
elsewhere, to equitable principles, to resolve the priority dispute. When the buyer
does not sell any of the commingled inventory, those principles award priority to SP1
in an amount equal to the value of the collateral transferred.
Harris, supra note 1, at 235-36 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). I will dispute the
correctness of the italicized assumption later on. See also Carlson & Shupack, Part II, supra
note 44, at 864 ("Although the matter is considered here for the first time, we suggest that a
judicial lien attaching to the whole after the moment of commingling is, of course, always
junior. The only security interests that survive to encumber the whole are security interests
perfected before commingling. As such, they prevail under the "first in time" rule of section
9-301.").
211. This temporal order would have occurred as a matter of course if SP3 had an
after-acquired property claim on inventory at the time the bulk seller transferred inventory
to B. In such a case, SP3 would have a senior security on all inventory except that inventory
transferred in the bulk sale. For a case involving just these facts, see In re San Juan Packers, Inc., 696 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1983) (ruling the parties to be pari passu under section 9315(2)).
212. Though we are just pretending that the case involved commingling.
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agree with Harris that SP3 is junior, not pari passu with SP1 and
SP2, but Harris does not tell us who has priority between SP1 and
SP2•213 This subpriority issue is worth exploring.
b. The Priority of SP1 and SP2 Inter Se-Before commingling, SP 1 was senior to SP2, but after commingling, section 9315(2), if read literally, equalizes SP1 and SP2• That is, SP1 has
lost its priority vis-a-vis SP2•
This should not be the rule. Instead, we should recognize that
section 9-315(2) contains an unacknowledged assumption-that
where two nonpurchase money security interests encumber a component added to the common mass, with one senior to the other,
their priority vis-a-vis each other is not affected by the pro rata
rule of section 9-315(2). Instead, the portion that SP1 and SP2
claim should be given to them jointly, with SP 1 having priority
over SP2 for this amount. 214
As a matter of fact, SP2 was a purchase money lender and so
should have had priority over SP1. 215 But purchase money status
requires that the purchase money collateral still be identifiable.
SP2 must be able to point to the exact inventory that is purchase
money inventory, or to inventory or other property that is proceeds
of the purchase money inventory. 216 If SP2 cannot do so, then an
213. This may be because, in his article, SP1 and SP2 are collapsed for expositional
purposes into a single entity. That is, my SP1 and SP2 equals Harris's SP1 , whereas SP3
does not exist in Harris's article.
214. For example, suppose SP1 and SP2 both claim $10,000 in inventory. This amount
is added to $5,000 of inventory as to which SP3 already had a pre-commingling perfected
security interest. On these facts, SP3 is pari passu with the combined unit of SP1 and SP2•
SP1 and SP2 are jointly entitled to $10,000 under the ratio described in section 9-315(2), but
SP1 would have seniority to SP2 for the entire amount.
215. Judge Williams evaded this issue by claiming that SP2 waived its purchase money
status by not asserting it on appeal. National Bank of Tex. v. West Tex. Wholesale Supply
Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d 1316, 1330 n.9 (5th Cir. 1983).
216. This tracing requirement can be shown to exist as a normal incident of property
law. Suppose SP1 claims inventory items A, B, and C, and any after-acquired inventory.
Suppose SP2 lends purchase money so that items D and E are acquired. Assume also that
SP2 has obtained a superpriority by complying with section 9-312(3). Now suppose that the
debtor commingled the group together, so that it is impossible to tell which item is which.
SP2 has no security interest on items A, B, and C (or, if it claimed nonpurchase money
inventory in addition to purchase money collateral, it is junior to these items). SP2 must
repossess only its collateral. If SP2 grabs any old piece of inventory, regardless of whether it
has a lien on it, then SP2 may be grabbing property of another. This is not allowed. SP2 can
repossess only the items in which SP2 has a security interest. Hence, SP2 must be able to
identify its collateral in order to repossess it. Cf. Raleigh Indus. of America, Inc. v. Tassone,
74 Cal. App. 3d 692; 141 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1977)(purchase money security interest in items D
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act of commingling must have occurred. That is, both SP1 and
SP2 claimed perfected security interests in separate items of inventory that subsequently found their way into a commingled mass.
Because this occurred, SP1 and SP2 should have shared a pro rata
priority under section 9-315(2). When the bulk sale to B occurred,
followed by a hypothetical second commingling, the second commingling invoked pro rata priority for a second time. Under this
scenario, SP1 and SP2 should have shared a pro rata priority with
SP3•
David Frisch, who has written the leading article on commingling, disagrees. 217 He claims that SP1 and SP2 can never be pari
passu under section 9-315(2). 218 Instead, SP2 is either senior or
junior to SP1, depending on whether SP2 perfected in time to preserve her superpriority. He has two arguments for this position;
one is linguistic, based on the language of Article 9, while the other
emphasizes the potential for abuse if a pari passu priority were the
rule. Neither argument is convincing.
The linguistic argument is that section 9-315(2) requires each
competing secured creditor to obtain a lien on the whole through
section 9-315(1). 219 That is, each secured party must have a lien on
the whole solely because its collateral was commingled with
noncollateral. 220 In McBee, 221 for example, SP1 obtained its lien on
the whole (of the seller's inventory) through an after-acquired
property clause, rather than solely through section 9-315(2). 222
Under Frisch's view, SP1 and SP2 would never be pari passu
under section 9-315(2).
and E did not create a security interest in other inventory). The Tassone case should be
read with care. It involved California's nonuniform (and since amended) Article 6, which
required nonpurchase money secured parties to notify general creditors as if the second
party were a bulk buyer.
217. Frisch, UCC Section 9-315: A Historical and Modern Perspective, 70 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 49 (1985).
218. Id. at 48-52.
219. Id. at 49.
220. Id.

221. Recall that we are assuming that the seller commingled SP2's purchase money
inventory with SP1's nonpurchase money inventory. The reported opinions do not say
whether this really occurred.
222. This commingling was presumed to have been accomplished by the seller; the
bulk sale to B has not yet occurred. Note that the reported opinions say nothing about the
seller's commingling or B's commingling. One suspects, however, that if one commingled,
both did, since their business practices were probably identical.
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The argument that SP1 must have obtained a lien on the
whole through commingling only is not convincing based on the
language of section 9-315(2). SP1 can claim a lien through commingling under section 9-315(1) and through the after-acquired
property clause. Nothing in section 9-315(2) prevents an after-acquired property clause from overlapping with security interests
through section 9-315(1).
As a second argument, Professor Frisch observes that if SP2
has failed to send the advance letter to SP1 required by section 9312(3)223 and, subsequently, if SP2 is subordinated to SP1 , then
SP2 can recoup part of this lost priority by becoming pari passu
under section 9-315(2). 224 This partial recoupment is seen as subverting the requirement that letters be sent to after-acquired
property lenders in inventory cases. Hence, to prevent such abuses,
whatever priorities are established under the ordinary purchase
money rules should be continued in spite of commingling.
This second point is a good one. Section 9-315(2) should not
have the effect of mitigating perfection mistakes. If SP1 is senior
because SP2 failed to send the letter required by section 9-312(3),
then SP2 should not benefit from loss of identity of the purchase
money collateral. From this admittedly good point, Professor
Frisch concludes that a purchase money lender should continue to
have priority, even in spite of commingling and loss of collateral
identity. 225
This is fine if SP2 fails to send the letter. But suppose SP2 has
sent the required letter and is senior to SP1 prior to commingling.
After commingling, SP2 can no longer identify its collateral. Suppose further that Frisch is correct and section 9-315(2) does not
apply. If pari passu priorities are forbidden, we must either abandon the tracing rule and give SP2 her superpriority anyway, or we
must apply the "first to file" rule.
Frisch favors abandoning the tracing requirement. 226 Yet, tracing is what makes Article 9 a "first in time is first in right"
property regime. Without tracing, a purchase money lender has an
223. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) (1987) (requiring purchase money secured party to give notification in writing to the holder of the conflicting security interest).
224. Frisch, supra note 217, at 51.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 48 ("A mass is apportionable and it is therefore possible to recognize a
[purchase money secured party's] superior right of disposition ....") ..
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effective floating lien on inventory; 227 In effect, the abandonment
of tracing renders Article 9 a regime of "last in time is first m
right."
Admiralty presents a lien system based in part on a rule of
"last in time is first in right." 228 The rule is no threat at all to
secured financing if we can be sure that every new loan added an
equivalent new value to the estate. But since we cannot be sure
that purchase money loans are rational in this way, the abandonment of tracing and the establishment of a "last in time" priority
shifts the risk from the purchase money lender to the· after-acquired property lender. 229
_
·
If we are resolved to hang onto tracing because it is fundamental to the rule of "first in time is first in right," then a purchase
money lender loses the superpriority if the collateral cannot be
identified. 230 If, per Frisch, section 9-315(2) cannot apply, then the
purchase money lender goes from superpriority to complete juniority, just because the debtor commingled. 231 Frisch's rule which is
based on the results of hypothetical misconduct by SP2, now pun. ishes SP2 in spite of her good behavior. of sending the letter
required by section 9-312(3)(a). 232
·
227. I am assuming that such a floating lien can be contained to inventory and that it
would not float around the debtor's entire estate. 'This limitation is rather arbitrary. If we
no longer care which items the purchase money lender grabs, why should the scope of floatation be limited to inventory, or even personal property?
228. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 588 (2d ed. 1975).
229. Two often cited commentators have emotionally predicted that "[u]nless this elementary condition [of tracing] is satisfied, no creditor will ever agree to lend on a secured
basis." Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE
L.J. 1143, 1177 (1979). Such a statement is overwrought; collateral is constantly invaded by
all sorts of legal and nonlegal factors, and yet, secured lending continues to exist. The statement nevertheless does capture a partial truth: if the purchase money priority is enforced
without strict attention to tracing, the property rights of the after-acquired property lender
are compromised.
·
230. See Frisch, supra note 217, at 48.
,
231. See id. at 48-51. Frisch, of course, would favor SP2 by abandoning the tracing
rule. The point made in the text is that if we keep tracing and still insist that pro rata
sharing is inappropriate, then SP2 is rendered junior by any act of commingling.
232. Ironically, while Frisch favors the survival of the purchase money status in case
of commingling (even though the purchase money collateral can no longer be located), he
disfavors it in accession cases, where the purchase money collateral can be identified. See id.
at 58-59. I think he has it>precisely backwards! •
One feature of an accession (a part added to the whole) is that a secured party claiming
the part may elect her priority under the accessions statute (section 9-314) or under the
commingling statute (section 9-315). See U.C.C. § 9-315 comment 3 (1987). If the secured
party claiming the part elects to have a security interest in the whole under section 9-315,
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The rule I advocate avoids the unfortunate side effect that
Professor Frisch has identified and therefore constitutes the better
medicine. First, if SP2 has perfected a purchase money security interest, and if the debtor has commingled the purchase money
inventory, then SP2 is demoted for failure to identifiy the collateral, but only to pari passu____.:not total juniority. Second, if SP2 has
not established priority over SP1, then she is totally subordinated
under section 9-315(2).
An example of this is as follows: Assume that SP1 is an afteracquired property lender who has advanced $150 and who claims
$100 of existing inventory. SP2 is a purchase money lender who
claims $80 of identifiable inventory and who lent $60. Before commingling, SP1 has a junior security interest to the $80 in inventory
(that is, a claim on the $20 in equity). SP2 has no claim on the
other nonpurchase money collateral (or, if the security interest so
provides, a claim that is junior to SP1's security interest).
Now suppose that the debtor commingles and also that the
total inventory has shrunk from $180 to $120 in value. That is,
losses have occurred that must be allocated between SP 1 and SP2•
If SP2 perfected by sending SP1 the proper letter under section 9312 (3), then SP1 is pari passu with the combined SPrSP1 unit of
purchase money inventory. Thus, SP1 is entitled to a pro rata
share of the remaining inventory according to this formula: 233
Frisch thinks that such a secured party forfeits any purchase money status. His reason is
that secured parties who originally had the whole (and not the part) might wish to give
future advances on the basis of the existing whole. These would-be advancers should not be
sent to the files to see if any parts are subject to purchase money priorities. Frisch, supra
note 217, at 48. Hence, the lenders on the whole should be able to override the purchase
money lender with future advances.
This is a great argument for never permitting a purchase money priority-anytime, anywhere. (Indeed, it has been followed with regard to- inventory, unless the purchase money
lender warns the after-acquired property lender with a letter before the debtor receives possession of the new collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1987)). Unless Professor Frisch wants to
abandon the entire purchase money priority, consistency demands that purchase money security interests in accessions retain their superpriority.
Frisch thus gets it backwards in this way: where the purchase money collateral is identifiable (accession cases), he denies the superpriority, but ought to allow it. Where the
purchase money collateral is not identifiable (commingling cases), the superpriority should
be deemed lost.
233. This formula is based on section 9-315(2), which provides that SP1 and SP2 are to
"rank equally according to the ratio that the cost of the goods to which each interest originally attached bears to the cost of the total product or mass." U.C.C. § 9-315(2) (1987).
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120 = $66.66

The combined SP2-SP1 unit (representing the purchase money
contribution to the commingled pool) gets this share:

8
~

80

X

120 = $53.33

Of this combined share, SP2 is totally senior to SP1, so that SP2
(who lent $60) takes it all.
Now suppose that SP2 had not perfected according to section
9-312(3). Now SP2 is junior as to the combined SPrSP1 unit of
$53.33. Hence, SP1 (on these numbers) would take its own $66.66
share and would take what it needs ($33.33) from the combined
SP2-SP1 share of .$53.33. SP2 is junior and gets only the leftovers
of $20.00. In this way, if SP2 has not sent the letter that section 9312(3) requires, SP2 is totally junior to SP1, whether commingling
occurs or not. But if SP2 has sent the fateful letter, SP2 does not
fall all the way to juniority if tracing is impossible due to commingling. Instead, SP2 becomes pari passu with SP1•
c. Expansion and Shrinkage of Inventory.-Professor Harris
has added another unstated assumption to the mechanics of section 9-315(2)'s unusual priority: if SP1 and SP2 are undersecured,
they may not use commingling as an excuse to improve their position.234 That is, if the inventory encumbered by the liens of SP1
and SP2 equals $10,000 in value, then $10,000 is the most they can
receive, no matter what. 235 If the mass of commingled inventory
expands, the excess constitutes debtor equity. In the context of the
McBee case, this debtor equity was given to SP3, so that SP3 was
the sole beneficiary of inventory expansion. 236
234. See Harris, supra note 1, at 234-35.
235. David Frisch locates this limitation idea in the origins of section 9-315(1)(b) in
the equity doctrine of tracing, where improvement of position was never allowed. See
Frisch, supra note 217, at 41-45.
236. Judge Williams similarly limited SP1 and SP2 to a maximum entitlement-the
amount of pre-sale inventory commingled in the mass (suggesting that perhaps McBee was
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Although not stated in section 9-315, this innovation makes
sense. 237 But I disagree with Harris's view that the security interest
of SP1 and SP2 might shrink from the $10,000 li~it if the mass
decreases in value (through sale to customers). Recall that Harris
and I agree that SP1 and SP2 have priority to the mass over SP3 ,
with the proviso that SP1 and -SP2 be limited to the amount of the
an unacknowledged commingling case); See National Bank of Tex. v. West Tex. Wholesale
Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2q l316, 1331 (5th Cir. 1983). ("While [SPiJ and [SP2 's]
priority is limited to the overallvatue of. the inventory transferred in bulk to [BJ, it is not
limited to the actual inventory remaining and traceable to the bulk sale." (footnotes omitted
and emphasis in original)). Judge Williams attempts to justify this limitation based upon
comparison to voidable preference law:
The trustee in bankruptcy is not a party to this proceeding. We note, however, that
under the Bankruptcy Act an after-acquired property interest in collateral to the extent of the value of the collateral at a set pre~bankruptcy date may only be valid
against the trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 547. Thus, under the Act, a secured creditor-even
without an intervening bulk sale_:might not be able to enforce his "floating" lien for
the greater value of inventory at the time of bankruptcy. Without deciding whether
the result we reach is required by this section of the Bankruptcy Act, we note its
consistency with the result we reach under the U.C.C.
Id. at 1331 n.20 (citation omitted). Roughly. translated, Judge Williams seems to be saying
that occasionally a secured party claims inventory in the bankrupt estate but is limited by
Bankruptcy Code section 547(c)(5) to a maximum amount of inventory to prevent an improvement of position by that secured party. SP1 and SP2 should be similarly limited, so
they do not improve their position at the expense of SP3•
237. David Frisch disagrees. He fears that the limited secured party will foreclose and
have a poor incentive to obtain a'good price. That is, if the secured party is limited to the
value of the contributed collateral and yet forecloses on the whole, the secured party will
simply stop marketing the whole once her own security interest is satisfied; but if that secured party had a higher entitlement, she would also have a better incentive. See Frisch,
supra note 217, at 40. This ignores the fact that many of these cases will be litigated in
bankruptcy where the trustee will have the· incentive to maximize the price, and making
irrelevant the secured party's lack of an incentive.
Frisch also points out that the. limitation view requires a judicial valuation, which is
painful,· whereas the nonlimitation view simply gives the secured party collateral up to the
fixed amount of her claim. See id: This also ignores the fact that, in bankruptcy, valuation
may be necessary anyway, unless. an immediate· sale is planned, but otherwise, one has to
admit that the necessity of valuations is unfortunate.
Finally, Frisch notes that the secured party's right to proceeds is not limited by the
amount of the collateral contributed byJhe"secured party. See id. at 40-41. That is, under a
proceeds theory, the secured patty can· improve her position. By analogy, the secured party
should be able to improve her position in commingling cases. It is true that a secured party
can improve her position through proceeds, but proceeds must be identifiable, whereas, by
definition, commingled assets are nQt identifiable. See id. at 42. Consequently, in commingling cases, the secured party wants to get other people's property, whereas in proceeds
theory, the secured party simply wants to collect the identifiable fruits of its own identifiable collateral. These differences weaken, or at least complicate, the aesthetics of Frisch's
analogy.
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inventory sold to B ($10,000, in Harris's hypothetical numbers). If
the mass expands, SP3 benefits, but if the mass shrinks, then SP3
ought to lose out first before SP1 and SP2 suffer, just like any
subordinate creditor would. Shrinkage should come out of the
debtor equity first and out of the junior creditor's entitlement
before the senior creditors are affected. This follows from the fact
that security interests routinely work this way, and nothing in section 9-315 changes this result. 238
In contrast, Harris believes that, as the mass shrinks, the percentage share that SP1 and SP2 hold should shrink as well. 239 I
believe there is no basis for this. According to Harris, shrinkage
occurs if section 9-315(2) applies to the case, 240 but the whole premise of the discussion is that section 9-315 does not apply when
SP3's security interest attaches after commingling.
After the inventory shrinks, Harris pumps new inventory into
his hypothetical example and commingles it with old inventory.
Prior to commingling, the new-but-uncommingled inventory has
been encumbered only by SP3's security interest, by virtue of its
after-acquired property clause. 241 The security interests of SP1 and
SP2 do not attach to this inventory, ex hypothesi. Now section 9315(2) does apply, because both SP3, on the one hand, and SP 1SPrSP3 are contributing collateral to a commingled pool. As to
this newly constituted pool of inventory, SP3 shares equally with
SPi-SPrSP3. In other words, as to past inventory SP1 and SP2 , as
a unit, are senior to SP3, but as to the new inventory added to the
group, SP3 is pari passu with the combined share of SP1 , SP2 , and
SP3. That is, part of SP3's claim is junior to SP1 and SP2 , and part
of the claim will be pari passu. In any case, there is no reason to
apply section 9-315(2) until SP3 contributes inventory that SP1
and SP2 cannot get. Professor Harris provides the following numerical example:
238. At least in the specific circumstance under consideration, this occurs where SP1
and SP2 had perfected security interests before commingling, and SP3 took a perfected security interest in inventory after commingling. It is the post-commingling perfection that
kept SP3 from being pro rata with its competitors.
239. See Harris, supra note 1, at 236:37.
240. See id.
241. I am assuming that B is not bound on the after-acquired property agreement
between S, SP1, and SP2• If Band Sare deemed merged, then SP1 and SP2 are pasi passu
with regard to the new-but-uncommingled inventory. See supra text accompanying notes
173-205.
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[A]ssume that B owns $15,000 of commingled inventory, of which
SP1's share is $10,000 and [SP3 's] is $5000. If B sells $6000 of the
inventory, then SP1 and [SP 3] will share in the remaining $9000 as
they did in the $15,000; that is, SP1 will receive two-thirds ($6000)
and [SP3 ] will receive one-third ($3000). 242

I take issue with the last sentence. I think that, on Harris's numbers, SP1 has $9000 of inventory, and SP3 has none. Harris
continues:
As B acquires new inventory and commingles it, [SP3]'s share will
increase. Suppose that $11,000 of new collateral is added to the
$9000 remaining. Because SP1's interest attaches to the goods when
they are already encumbered by [SP3] 's security interest, the extent
of [SP3]'s share of the mass should be increased by the $11,000 of
newly added value. 243

Here is how we differ. I would say that SP1 and SP2 get 9/20, or
$9,000, and SP3 gets 11/20, or $11,000. Harris gives SP1 and SP2
less than I would ($6,000) because he has already knocked down
SP1 and SP2 from $9000 (incorrectly in my view). 244
From this point forward, the ratios of SP1 and SP2, on the
one hand, and SP3, on the other, are preserved. This is because
section 9-315 really does apply from now ori; SP3 has contributed
collateral to the commingled mass after SP3 perfected a security
interest in collateral to which SP1 and SP2 had no claim. Before,
SP3 took a security interest only after commingling had already
occurred. Thus, an unstated premise of section 9-315(2) is that
each pro rata security interest must have attached to uncommingled property before commingling.

B. A Short Statute of Limitations
Besides awarding post-sale inventory to the seller's secured
parties, McBee has a second interesting aspect. According to Judge
Williams, if the perfected security interests of SP1 and SP2 survive
the bulk sale because B did not comply with the provisions of Arti242. Harris, supra note 1, at 236-37.
243. Id. at 237. The last remark that SP3 is senior because SP3's security interest attached (and was perfected) first may seem a little confusing. All Harris is doing here is
attempting to reconcile section 9-315(2) with the "first in time is first in right" rule. Harris
means to apply section 9-315(2) in order that the parties share pro rata.
244. "Thus [SP3] will be entitled to 70% (14/20), and SP 1 to 30% (6/20)." Id.
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cle 6, the security interests could survive for only six months. 245 In
defending the view that SP1 and SP2 should have the inventory
acquired by the buyer after the bulk sale, Judge Williams sought
to calm SP3 with the following observation:
We find further support for our conclusion in the statutory pattern.
The transferor's creditor is not saved harmless forever in a non-complying bulk transfer. Article 6 limits the period in which a
transferor's creditor may assert a security interest to six months after the non-complying bulk transfer, unless there has beeri
concealment of the transfer. This limitations period evidences a policy that at some point a diligent creditor should realize that a
transfer has occurred absent concealment of that fact and despite
his lack of notice. If the prior creditor does not exercise such diligence, his security interest in the transferred property is lost. This
time limitation was met in this case by [SP1 and SP2]. The time
limitation supports our conclusion that Article 6 is a reasonable and
balanced provision in preserving the security interests of the transferor's creditors effective against the transferee. 246

Thus, according to Judge Williams, a perfected security interest
survives a noncomplying bulk transfer, but not for long! Unless the
transfer· has been concealed, the security interests are dead within
six months, unless the secured parties bring an "action under this
Article. " 247
In ruling that .the secured parties had only six months to ~ssert their perfected security interests, Judge Williams may have
imagined that he was doing the secured parties a favor. According
to Judge Williams, Article 9 provided only four months, compared
to six months under Article 6. 248 Since the secured parties asserted
their claims in the fifth month, they could be thankful that the
Article 6 rules applied. According to Judge Williams:
We agree with the bankruptcy court that the four-month period for
refiling upon a name change of the debtor under [section 9-402(7)]
does not apply here. If this general Article 9 provision applied, it
would in effect reduce the specific provision in Article 6 from six to
245. National Bank of Tex. v. West Tex. Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714
F.2d 1316, 1328 (5th Cir. 1983).
246. Id. at 1328-29 (footnote omitted) (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.111
(Vernon 1968)).
247. u.c.c. § 6-111 (1987).
248. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1329 n.19.
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four months. Where, as here, a specific section of the Code applies
to a particular situation, the specific provision should govern. Thus,
the six-month period in Article 6 relating to non-complying bulk
sales, was correctly applied by the bankruptcy court.249

The bankruptcy court refused to apply the four-month rule of section 9-402(7) 250 because no one changed her name. 251 Instead, the
collateral was transferred from one person to another. It is possible
to read the above passage from the appellate opinion as implying
that the four-month rule did apply, except that the narrow Article
6 rule trumps the more general Article 9 rule.
If this is what Judge Williams meant, his view does not comport with the text of section 9-402(7). This by-now-all-too-familiar
section provides:
Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organization its name, identity or corporate structure that a filed financing
statement becomes seriously misleading, the filing is not effective to
perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more
than four months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing statement is filed before the expiration of that time. A filed
financing statement remains effective with respect to collateral
transferred by the debtor even though the secured party knows of
or consents to the transfer. 252

Judge Williams may have misread section 9-402(7) for two reasons.
First, this section does not apply when property is transferred
from one debtor. to another-only when a single debtor changes
her name while retaining the collateral. This is the import of the
last sentence of the above-qµoted passage. 253 Second, even if section 9-402(7) did apply, it is no statute of limitations, as Judge
Williams supposes. Instead, under section 9-402(7), old collateral
remains encumbered by a perfected security interest. If collateral
is acquired more than four months after the name change, section
9-402(7) provides that the financing statement is no longer compe249. Id. (citation omitted).
250. u.c.c. § 9-402(7) (1987).
251. In re McBee, 20 Bankr. 361, 366 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1982).
252. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1987) (emphasis added).
253. See id. § 9-402 comment 8. In Bank of the West v. Commercial Credit Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 852 F.2d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 1988), Judge Thompson thought the second sentence of
section 9-402(7) might apply when buyer and seller are corporate subsidiaries owned by the
same parent. But this ruling was totally unnecessary to his analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 161-64.
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tent to perfect the security interest that attaches thereto. 264 Hence,
in McBee, even if section 9-402(7) applied, any inventory acquired
by the debtor or the noncomplying buyer on or before a date four
months after the bulk sale would be encumbered by a perfected
security interest subject to no statute of limitations at all. Any inventory acquired four months after the bulk sale, would be
encumbered by unperfected security interests as to which no statute of limitations applies.
Article 9, then, contains no relevant statute of limitations. At
best, it provides for occasional lapsed perfection. 2 n Therefore,
Judge Williams wasn't handing out any favors when he applied the
six-month statute of limitations in section 6-111.
Judge Williams's reading of section 6qll is easily avoided. According to section 6-111, "No action under this Article shall be
brought nor levy made more than six months after the date on
which the transferee took possession of the goods unless the transfer has been concealed."2116 Thus, the six-month statute of
limitations applies only to actions under Article 6. If a secured
party has a surviving security interest against inventory sold to a
noncomplying bulk buyer, the secured party has an action under
Article 9, not Article 6. Hence, the statute of limitations of Article
6 does not apply.

C.

Subsequent Bona Fide Purchasers for Value

According to section 6-110:
When the title of a transferee to property is subject to a defect by
reason of his non-compliance with the requirements of this Article,
then:
(1)

a purchaser of any of such property from such transferee
who pays no value or who takes with notice of such noncompliance takes subject to such defect, but

254. See Knippenberg, supra note 190, at 77-78. For an effective attack on section 9402(7), see Westbrook, Glitch: Section 9-402(7) and the U.C.C. Revision Process, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 408 (1984).
255. A perfected security interest becomes unperfected after five years, unless a continuation statement is timely filed. U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (1987). Furthermore, tangible
collateral removed from the states becomes unperfected after four months. Id. § 9-103(d)(i).
These are not statutes of limitations since the security interest lives on in an unperfected
state.
256. Id. § 6-111 (emphasis added).
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a purchaser for value in good faith and without such notice takes free of such defect. m

In the McBee case, the noncomplying transferee in bulk conveyed
a security interest to SP3• SP3 argued that it should take free of
security interests by virtue of section 6-110. 2118 The McBee court
reasoned that, since SP1 and SP2 had already filed a financing
statement, SP3 automatically had notice. 259 Steven Harris argues 260
that the McBee court egregiously ignored the general definition of
"notice" provided in section 1-201(26): "A person 'receives' a notice or notification when (a) it comes to his attention; or (b) it is
duly delivered at the place of business through which the contract
was made or at any other place held out by him as the place for
rece1pt of such communications." 261 But Harris overlooks section
1-201(27), which provides:
Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received by an organization is effective for a particular transaction from the time when it
is brought to the attention of the individual conducting that transaction, and in any event from the time when it would have been
brought to his attention if the organization had exercised due
diligence. 262

Section 1-201(27) indicates that knowledge is received when,
through the use of due diligence, it should have been received. And
knowledge "should have been received" if SP3 had taken the
trouble to check put the UCC records. If SP3 had knowledge under
this standard, surely it had notice within the meaning of section 6110. These observations vindicate Judge Williams against Professor Harris's criticism. 263
257. Id. § 6-110.
258. National Bank of Tex. v. West Tex. Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714
F.2d 1316, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983).
259. Id.
260. Harris, supra note 1, at 226.
261. u.c.c. § 1-201(26) (1987).
262. Id. § 1-201(27). See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
263. One prominent case does emphasize that Article 6 imposes no duty of inquiry on
SP3 with regard to general creditors. Adrian Tabin Corp. v. Climax Boutique, Inc., 34
N.Y.2d 210, 313 N.E.2d 66, 356 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1974). This is undoubtedly correct with regard to general creditors, but we are concerned with whether SP3 can be a good faith
purchaser for value under section 6-110 who takes free of perfected security interests. The
whole purpose of perfecting a security interest should be to defeat subsequent purchasers
for value, and even purchasers under section 6-110 should likewise be defeated.
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To supplement his reasoning, Judge Williams also ruled that
SP3 could not be a "purchaser" within the meaning of section 6110. 264 This ignores the definition of "purchase" which provides,
" 'Purchase' includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary
transaction creating an interest in property."265 This particular rationale is neither satisfactory nor necessary to Judge Williams's
result. If the McBee interpretation of section 6-110-secured parties are not purchasers-is followed, then unfortunate
consequences result. Suppose that SP1 and SP2 had failed to perfect. SP3 took a security interest from the bulk transferee without
knowledge of SP 1 and SP2• Under the McBee interpretation of section 6-110, SP3 would still be junior because she is not a
"purchaser" and hence does not take free of the bulk transferee's
failure to comply with Article 6. This should not be the rule. Instead, section 9-312(5)(a) should supply the rule; and SP3 should
win as a good faith purchaser who was the first to file a financing
statement under Article 9. 266
264. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1330.
265. U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (1987). For a case holding a secured party is a purchaser under
section 6-110, see Mayfield Dairy Farms, Inc. v. McKenney, 612 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. 1981).
266. There is a possible implication in section 6-110 that an unperfected SPa is a purchaser for value entitled to priority. Professor Harris would still apply the "first-to-file"
rule, with the proviso that SPa must always have no notice or knowledge of the earlier Artide 6 defect. That is, SPa cannot have priority over SP1 or SP2 until SPa files a financing
statement before SP1 or SP2• But even if SPa accomplishes this, SPa loses if she knew of the
Article 6 defect.
Thus, if SPa (who has filed first) knows of the unperfected security interest but not of
the Article 6 defect, then it appears that Harris would give priority to SPa on the theory
that section 6-110 is not to the contrary and because Article 9 creates a race priority. Harris,
supra note 1, at 241 n.239 ("Even if [SPal takes its security interest after learning of SP1's,
[SPal still will prevail if [SPal is the first to file.").
Some have argued that Article 9 is not the brute race priority it is usually taken to be.
Carlson, supra note 86, at 260-68; Nickles, Rethinking Some U.C.C. Article 9
Problems-Subrogation; Equitable Liens; Actual Knowledge; Waiver of Security Interests;
Secured Party Liability for Conversion Under Part 5, 34 ARK. L. REV. 89 (1980); see U.C.C.
§ 9-401(2) (1987) (ff SP 1 has filed in the wroQ.g office, knowledgeable SP 2 is junior to SP1).
Except for this disagreement, Harris's reason for keeping Article 9 priorities in general
(where B is a noncomplying bulk transferee) is sound: otherwise SPa, if unperfected, would
beat out general creditors of the first debtor who have Article 6 remedies. Yet Article 9
makes clear that judicial lien creditors should have priority over unperfected secured parties. Id. § 9-301(1)(b).
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THE UNPERFECTED SECURED PARTY AND THE NONCOMPLYING
BUYER

The only quadrant of Figure One that should be difficult is the
southeasterly one-where both the secured party and the buyer
fail to do their duty under their respective articles. Now if the noncomplying buyer knows of the unperfected security interest, the
priority solution is not hard. The buyer absolutely depends on being. a buyer or transferee in bulk without knowledge under section
9-301(1)(c); If the buyer cannot qualify for priority here, the
buyer's position is hopeless, whether or not she has complied with
Article 6.
But if the buyer is without knowledge within the meaning of
section 9-301(1)(c), the solution to the priority problem is imponderable. On the one hand, the buyer has not complied with Article
6 by sending notice to the creditors of the bulk sale. On the other
hand, the secured party has not perfected. The dilemma can be
stated this way. Article 6 makes the buyer the villain, and Article 9
makes the unperfected secured party the villain,267 yet in this pri267. The two statutory schemes have a different perspective on who the villains and
victims are. Under Article 6, the bulk transferee is the villain who is burdened with the duty
of notifying preexisting victims (the seller's creditors) of the bulk sale. Under Article 9, the
secured party is the villain who must notify subsequent victims (buyers and creditors).
Commercial law never permits generalizations quite so elegant as this, and so I must
qualify the above by exceptions. First, it must be said that Article 9 imposes a perfection
duty on purchase money lenders with regard to parties who are coeval, not subsequent.
Thus, to preserve priority against after-acquired lenders, a purchase money secured party
must perfect within a ten-day grace period, in some cases. U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2), 9-312(4)
(1987). See generally Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment, supra note 32, at 516-17.
Second, a secured party requires perfection against not merely a coeval party but a later
party who files and perfects before the purchase money lender does. If the collateral is not
inventory, purchase money security interest status allows a "first in time" purchase money
secured party to perfect second and still take priority, For example, suppose a secured party
has established an unperfected purchase money security interest on equipment, and the
debtor subsequently grants a security interest to a lender. This second security interest is
not an after-acquired property interest; it is an ordinary security interest that is second in
time. The purchase money security interest can still have priority if the purchase money
security interest lender files within the grace period provided. This grace period commences
when the debtor receives the collateral and terminates ten days later. U.C.C. § 9-312(4)
(1987). In many states, this grace period has been extended to 20 days. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE
§§ 7-9-301(2), 7-9-312(4) (1984); CAL. COMM. CODE § 9312(4) (1990); N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2),
9-312(4) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
In such a case, the purchase money security interest is first in time, but its purchase
money status allows it to defeat a lien which is not simultaneously created. Yet this subsequent lienor cannot possibly benefit from the perfecting act because. this perfection is
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ority battle each party is both villain and victim together. Here,
two scoundrels face off for the priority's puck when both should be
in the penalty box. Hence, we are condemned to pick the lesser of
two evils. 268
A.

The Frydlewicz Case

If the noncompying buyer has no knowledge, she might win if
she is still a "buyer" or "transferee in bulk" within the meaning of
section 9-301(1)(c), in spite of the noncompliance. The one and
only case on this question, National Bank of Royal Oak v.
Frydlewicz, 269 .was decided the other way. In Frydlewicz, the unperfected secured party won because a noncomplying bulk
transferee is no bulk transferee (or other buyer )270 at all. Hence,
section 9-301(1)(c) could not be used to destroy or subordinate the
unperfected security interest. 271
Such arguing must be recognized for what it is: conclusions
smuggled into the analysis in the form of argument. The question
is: What is a transferee in bulk? The argument just presented ("a
subsequent, not advance, notice. That is, the second creditor has already advanced funds by
the time the purchase money lender has perfected.
This anomaly does not work for inventory, since no grace period is provided for such
collateral. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1987). On the other hand, if the "second in time" lien is a
judicial lien (or a bulk sale), then a grace period is provided for all kinds of collateral. Id. §
9-301(2).
268. Or, as Professor Harris would have it, with his law-and-economics search for the
"least cost avoider," we must sl,larch for the most efficient victim. See infra text accompanying notes 290-309.
269. 67 Mich.. App. 417, 241 N.W.2d 471 (1976).
270. Once again, section 9-301(1)(c) provides that an unperfected security interest is
subordinate to "a person who is not a secured party and who is a transferee in bulk or other
buyer not in ordinary course of business ... to the extent that he gives value and receives
delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected." U.C.C. § 9-30l(l)(c) (1987).
271. The court in Frydlewicz states:
Normally, as a transferee in bulk, National would be entitled to priority over plaintiff's unperfected security interest ... [pjursuant to UCC § 9-30l(l)(c) .... However,
National failed to satisfy the requirements necessary under the bulk transfer provisions of UCC art. 6 to assert a claim of priority as a transferee in bulk.
The trial court found National to be a transferee in bulk and, therefore, to be
subordinate to plaintiff's rights in the disputed merchandise.
Frydlewicz, 241 N.W.2d at 473. I read this passage to mean that National was a noncomplying bulk transferee under Article 6 and hence not a bulk transferee under section 9301(1)(c).
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noncomplying transferee in bulk is no transferee in bulk at all")
seems infected by the preconceived notion that a noncomplying
transferee should not prevail. 272 Hence, rather than depending on
the words "transferee in bulk" for an objective and uncontroversial
meaning, it might be better simply to look for policy reasons in
lieu of inherent content in the words "transferee in bulk." 273
But such a retreat to policy may also disappoint. For example,
one might argue that favoring the secured party would encourage
the bulk transferee to comply. But one would have to concede that,
to some degree, favoring the secured party would discourage the
secured party from complying with Article 9. Thus, we are faced
with an imponderable cost-benefit speculation for which no data
exist. 274

B. Resurrection of the Security Interest
Steven Harris criticizes the reasoning of Frydlewicz, but likes
the result. The new rationale he proposes, however, is self-contradictory. According to Harris:
Article 6 penalizes the noncomplying buyer by making the transfer
"ineffective" against creditors of the seller.... A fair reading of the
word "ineffective" as it applies to secured creditors should yield an
analogous result: the secured creditor may disregard the transfer
and treat the goods as still belonging to the transferor. That is, upon
default the secured party may "foreclose or otherwise enforce the
security interest by any available judicial procedure." 275
272. More precisely, the court held that the buyer was not a "transferee in bulk"
within the meaning of section 9-30l(l)(c) because noncomplying transferees were not transferees at all. Id. 241 N.W.2d at 473. This leads Professor Harris to wonder whether the
buyer should still win because, even though not a "transferee in bulk," it was still an "other
buyer not in the ordinary course of business." Harris, supra note 1, at 205. But see U.C.C. §
1-201(9) (1987) (" 'Buying' ... does not include a transfer in bulk .... "). This is not a good
point. The court easily could have extended its reasoning to say that any transferee or buyer
who is required to comply with Article 6 and does not is neither a transferee nor a buyer.
273. For an eloquent plea against decision by categories and in favor of consequentialist reasoning, see Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 587, 651-54
(1989).
274. Lack of data rarely deters an experienced law-and-economics scholar, and it is to
Professor Harris's great credit that he largely avoids any definitive conclusions based on the
intuited costs and benefits of secured parties and bulk buyers in the abstract. Comments on
Harris's analysis can be found infra in the text accompanying notes 290-309.
275. Harris, supra note 1, at 207-08 (quoting U.C.C. § 9-501(1) (1987)) (footnotes
omitted).
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To put it another way, one of the remedies under Article 6 is supposed to be the assertion of an Article 9 security interest
(provided, of course, that the creditor had one in the first place). 276
The paradox-here is that, according to Harris, the noncomplying bulk transferee is a bulk transferee for the purpose of section
9-301(1)(c), so that the security interest that SP1 wants to assert
has been killed off. That is, the noncomplying buyer had no knowledge of the earlier unperfected security interest and so took free of
it under section 9-301(1)(c). SPi's security interest is _therefore
dead and gone. If so, how can SP1 assert a security interest under
Article 6? 277
In fact, Harris's view that secured parties have security interests under Article 6 is involved in a contradiction. This view
depends upon the noncomplying transferee in bulk not being a
buyer or transferee in bulk under section 9-301(1)(c), the very view
Harris criticizes. Only if the noncomplying buyer fails to kill off
the competing security interest under section 9-301(1)(c) can there
still be a security interest for Article 6 to deal with. For this reason, his doctrinal argument does not seem to work. 278
Since Harris's article was published, the Permanent Editorial
Board of the UCC has promulgated a new Article 6. Under the
revised version of Article 6, creditors of the noncomplying buyer no
longer have any in rem claims against the buyer's property. Instead, they have only in personam rights against the buyer
personally and only for proximately caused damage, 279 which, to
boot, is automatically subject to limitation. 28° Furthermore, the
noncomplying buyer is excused if her failure was in good faith. 281
276. This notion of resurrection tempts Harris to take the position that a short sixmonth statute of limitations does apply to security interests that were unperfected at the
time of the bulk sale, although Harris is tentative on this subject. See id. at 219 n.167.
277. To use Harris's own words against him: "The rights of unsecured and secured
creditors inter se are set forth clearly in Article 9. Nothing in Article 6 justifies adjusting
them." Id. at 211.
278. One point can be made in favor of the Frydlewicz reasoning: the transfer in bulk
is "ineffective,'' according to Article 6, so that it can be said no transfer took place for the
purposes of section 9-301(1)(c).
279. u.c.c. § 6-107(1) (1988).
280. The damage limitation is actually fairly generous and may even exceed what is
available under the in rem system of the original Article 6. According to new section 6107(4), the cumulative liability of the noncomplying buyer is twice the net contract price,
minus any amount actually paid to the seller or the seller's creditors. See id. § 6-107(4).
281. Id. § 6-107(3).
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This change from property concepts in the style of fraudulent conveyance law is a blow to general creditors. Before, they could use a
judgment against the seller and levy the property of the buyer. 282
Now, they will have to start a separate in personam action against
the seller. Procedurally, this could take a much longer time. In addition, the creditors lose the "class action" quality that bankruptcy
law provides, in case the seller files for bankruptcy. 283 If the creditors had in rem rights against the buyer, the trustee would be
subrogated to these rights and would be able to recover the entire
bulk transfer, even if the aggregated claims of creditors identified
by the bankruptcy trustee are less than the value of the bulk transfer.284 If the general creditors have no in rem rights (i.e., no power
to avoid the bulk transfer), 285 then the bankruptcy trustee has no
ability to attack the bulk transfer at all under Article 6. 286
Meanwhile, this reform also deprives Professor Harris of his
argument. 287 Harris needed statements from Article 6 which made
the bulk transfer "ineffective'' against the seller's creditors, if the
buyer did not comply with notice requirements. 288 Under the new
version, noncomplying bulk transfers are fully effective against
creditors, who, in compensation, get in personam rights. This
throws Harris back to the disdained 289 reasoning of the Frydlewicz
case, which held that noncomplying buyers are not buyers at all
under Article 9. Ironically, under the new Act, the "good result" of
Frydlewicz depends utterly on the essentializing argument ("who
282. U.C.C, § 6-104 comment 2 (1987).
283. "The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property ...
that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim [against the
debtor]." 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1979).
284. Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931). Moore v. Bay is legislated into the Bankruptcy
Code in section 550(a), which provides "[T]o the extent that a transfer is avoided ... , the
trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so
orders, the value of such property ...." 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1979). See In re Figearo, 79
Bankr. 914 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987).
285. The ability of a general creditor to "avoid" a transfer to the noncomplying buyer
constitutes an in rem right in the buyer's assets. See Note, supra note 38, at 850.
286. On the other hand, under the new revisions, any creditor who does feel motivated
to pursue the bulk buyer can do so without fear of bankruptcy's automatic stay. Those first
in time, however, will shut out the slower footed creditors who were better off with Moore v.
Bay.
287. Professor Harris was, in fact, the person who pointed this out to me. In his words,
he feels "mooted out" by the new Article 6, for which he himself was the Reporter.
288. u.c.c. §§ 6-104(1), 6-105 (1988).
289. Harris, supra note 1, at 207-08.
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is or is not a transferee in bulk or a buyer") that Harris expressly
disfavored (but implicitly relied on).
C.

A Resort to Law-and-Economics

The priority between two · scoundrels-the noncomplying
buyer and the unperfected secured party-is undetermined by
UCC statutory language. Hence, Professor Harris has succumbed
to the temptation of turning to law-and-economics as a possible
answer for solving this pdority dispute. The idea is to find the efficient solution to the priority conundrum. Happily, the Harris
article, so very strong in almost all respects, is also much better
than average in its economic analysis. Harris;s CQnchision is that
the data are inconchisive enough to hazard an intelligent position
on what is efficient. 200 This should always be the answer in lawand-economics. Ariyone who ever comes up with any different answer simply has a deficient imagination about dreaming up
potential costs. The costs are endless, and ignoring them is completely arbitrary and destructive of the premises of the science. To
quote Arthur Alan Leff, anyone who hazards a guess without
knowing the quantity of each afuf every cost is "a booby."291
With this warning, let me say a few words about efficiency as a
normative program. Efficiency; iri the welfare sense; is a form of
utilitarianism. Efficiency · analysis hopes to maximize something.
The usual choices are utility or wealth. The only differen:ce between these two maximands is the deontological assumption about
what people are entitled to. If you are an egalitarian, you would
choose a common form of utilitarianism, which starts from a baseline wherein every human being is equally entitled to happiness. A
competing form of utilitarianism is wealth maximization, where
people are assumed to be unequal. They are entitled to whatever
happiness their pre-existing wealth can buy. That is, the rich are
disproportionately entitled to happiness compared to the poor.
This disgraceful elitism is the only difference between wealth maximization and egalitarian utilitarianism. 292 If wealth were
290. Id. at 216.
291. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L.
REV. 451, 476 (1974).
292. There are actually infinite utilitarianisms, as many as there are imaginable entitlement baselines. See Note, Judge Posner's Wealth Maximization Principle: Another
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redistributed so that everyone was equal, there would be no difference whatsoever between these methods. Furthermore, ordinary
utilitarianism demands that wealth be redistributed. This follows
from the declining utility people obtain from increments of wealth.
Wealth maximization, however succeeds in disabling income redistribution as a normative program because wealth cannot be
increased solely by shifting it around. There is no declining utility
for wealth when wealth is the numeraire by which utility is measured. Therefore, not only are the rich favored, but the existing
distributions of wealth are perpetuated by making wealth the
numeraire by which human preference is measured. 293
However it is measured, utilitarianism seeks to maximize
human satisfactions. But let us step back for a moment and consider what Harris implies by using law-and-economics on a
microscopically insignificant priority problem such as the noncomplying buyer against the unperfected secured party. 294 Could the
proper priority between unperfected secured parties and noncomplying bulk buyers possibly have a visible impact upon happiness
in the United States? Most people in the United States are unaware that bulk sales law even exists. How likely is it that the
answer to this priority problem will impact on the national welfare?295 Even if the priority question affected the price of credit
and hence the cost of production-a fact that must be proven and
Form of Utilitarianism?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 815, 818 (1989). In fact, most people don't even
acknowledge what the baselines are. Many utilitarians claim that everyone has an equal
entitlement . to happiness, or entitlements according to wealth, but they often end up
privileging Americans over foreigners, European cultures over third world cultures, human
beings over animals, etc.
293. Id. at 842-44.
2.94. Harris does not specify whether wealth in some other form of utility is being
maximized. But given his emphasis on cost reduction as per se desirable, I will assume that
wealth is being maximized in his discussion.
295. A somewhat different ploy would magnify tiny priority disputes into important
efficiency issues by emphasizing the ethical preferences of nonparticipants in the market
transactions. To illustrate, let us take Article 9's alleged race priority. Suppose D grants SP1
a security interest. SP1 forgets to perfect, but nobody is misled because D lists the security
interest in her financial reports. D then grants a security interest to SP2 who perfects
promptly. The usual view is that SP2 is senior in spite of SP2's knowledge. See Special
Project, The Priority Rules of Article Nine, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 834, 849 (1977).
The ethics of awarding priority to SP2 are unsavory. The dubious ethics become in
themselves enormous efficiency concerns if (1) you assume perfect knowledge of the situation among the public; and (2) no transaction costs in making their preferences known. If
every American (reconstituted through the assumption of perfect knowledge) would vote a
few pennies toward an ethical commercial law, these "external preferences" would swamp
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not assumed-there is still the intractable point that limited liability of corporations (and bankruptcy discharges) are specifically
designed to export costs to the unwitting public. If productive
costs rise for marginal business enterprises, the increased cost may
actually reduce externalities and therefore increase efficiency. In
short, the connection between this tiny little priority problem and
human happiness is so extravagantly tenuous that one may wonder
whether indulging in law-and-economics is not a total waste of
time. 296
So far, nothing I have said is inconsistent with Professor Harris's analysis. He too finds no answers in law-and-economics, and
all I have done so far is to suggest that this could have been predicted well in advance simply by the fact that the legal issue in
question is utterly trivial in the scheme of things. 297 There are,
however, certain things that I would like to say about Harris's
methodology. These points are harmless error, however, because
any utilities registered by the parties involved in actual commercial transactions. See generally Carlson, supra note 86, at 223°30.
Notice that this move makes ethical content-not the trivial commercial transaction
itself-the focus of wealth maximization. Incidentally, it is precisely this strategy that drives
Frank Michelman's celebrated efficiency analysis of fifth amendment compensation.
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv: L. REV. 1165, 1214-15 (1967) (dealing with "demoralization costs").
None of this analysis applies here, unless you think that the priority battle between
noncomplying bulk buyers and unperfected secured parties implicates some ethical principle
that the public actually holds. I do not 'perceive this to be the case in the priority dispute at
hand-the unperfected secured party versus the noncomplying bulk buyer.
296. In earlier days, I considered a priority problem that did not exceed Harris's problem in significance-the priority between judicial lien creditors who have served executions
but who have not enjoyed a sheriff's levy versus the unperfected secured party. I too tried to
figure out what was efficient. Carlson & Shupack, Part I, supra note 42, at 306-09. Therefore, the above comments are directed at myself more than anyone else. Law-and-economics
was just what you were expected to do in legal scholarship in the early 1980's. The last thing
law-and-economics asks of itself-the last thing it can bear!-is to examine its own premises. Here ·I hope to make up for an earlier uncritical perspective.
297. Paradoxically, wealth maximization works better as the policy questions become
more trivial and unimportant. If the policy question is monumental in scope, then the
wealth at stake becomes a large percentage of the voting power of the preference holders. If
this occurs, it triggers the "wealth effect" indeterminacy, where wealth maximization solutions turn entirely on who is considered initially to own the entitlement in question. See
generally Carlson, Reforming the Efficiency Criterion: Comments on Some Recent Suggestions, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 39, 52 (1986). Wealth effects imply that law-and-economics
becomes more and more valid the more trivial its policy concerns become. Accordingly, lawand-economics reaches its ultimate validity when it refuses to make any policy recommendations at all.
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Professor Harris reaches the right result-that law-and-economics
is a big dud on this question of priority between noncomplying
buyers and unperfected secured parties.
Harris writes:
One common approach to problems of risk allocation is to impose
the risk of loss on the party who can prevent or insure against the
loss at less cost. This allocation usually has two effects. First, it minimizes the resources spent on loss avoidance, thereby freeing those
resources for alternative uses. Second, because some losses are likely
to exceed one party's cost of avoidance but be less than the other
party's cost, allocating the loss to the efficient cost avoider is likely
to reduce the total number of losses. 298

This passage invokes the concept of the "least cost avoider." This
phrase is rhetorically more clever than most law-and-economics
tropes because it evades the issue of hidden external costs and
benefits and subsumes complete knowledge of these things into the
phrase "least cost." That is, if you really could know who is the
least cost avoider (and this cannot be known) then, by definition, it
is efficient to assign costs to this person. Or, to say it another way,
"least cost avoider" is simply a truism and has no more content
than to say "do what is efficient."
It is important to note that, if wealth is to be maximized, cost
reduction has an efficiency consequence if and only if the costs imposed are marginal costs of production. If a cost is simply a oneshot affair-a wealth transfer from one person to another-it has
no efficiency consequences. 299 For this reason, when Harris writes
that total resources spent on loss avoidance might be conserved by
the proper priority rule, 300 he overlooks the fact that one person's
loss is another's gain. As such, conservation of resources is a misnomer; wealth transfers by themselves neither decrease nor increase
wealth. Instead, the cost reduction must be felt in each and every
unit of future production. If the cost is marginal with respect to
future production, then a higher marginal cost (coupled with a
downward sloping demand curve) will produce genuine deadweight
losses in the market in question. But even a showing of marginality
298. Harris, supra note 1, at 211 (footnotes omitted).
299. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J.
232-33 (1980).
300. Harris, supra note 1, at 211.
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does not prove that least cost avoidance is per se efficient. A deadweight loss in one market may eliminate deadweight loss in
another market, and hence maintenance of the deadweight loss is
desirable. A "non-optimal" risk allocation might serve as a kind of
Pigouvian tax on producers who export costs to the public. 301
Yet another problem with least cost avoider analysis is that
the cost cannot be marginal unless the risk is noticeable, or unless
the 'risk proximately causes its prevention. 302 For example, if a
bulk buyer already has powerful incentives to comply with Article
6, a small reform in priorities between noncomplying buyers and
unperfected secured parties may have no effect on the behavior of
bulk buyers. If so, a change in the allocation of risk would make no
difference whatsoever. Or, to say it another way, not every legal
change induces human behavior to change. If the legal reform is
too trivial to waste time on, there are rational economic reasons for
not changing your behavior. 303
These problems-unacknowledged external costs and benefits
and public indifference to the legal change in question----:are the
grounds I assert to support the proposition that the priority between noncomplying buyers and unperfected secured parties has
no efficiency consequences. Professor Harris's approach is differ301. A Pigouvian tax is one in which a producer is taxed by the amount of external
costs exported to the public. As a result of the tax, the producer's incentives to invest are
returned to optimal efficiency.
302. Harris admirably recognizes this point, but only in part. He maintains that only
unperfected secured parties have so many incentives to perfect that another marginal incentive will make no difference. Harris, supra note 1, at 220. On the other hand, he thinks that
noncomplying buyers really will be encouraged to comply because a cheap alternative-holding the sales price in. escrow· until the short six-month statute of limitations is
past-:--cannot work for an unperfected security interest, which is subject to a much longer
statute of limitations. Id. at 218-19. As a result of this asymmetry, a cheap alternative to
complying with Article 6 is eliminated and so there will be more Article 6 compliance.
.303. This principle might be called "rational apathy." (I have borrowed this delightful
phrase from a talk given by Melvin Eisenberg on efficiency and corporate law.) The response
here, I suppose, is that if it makes no difference, why not go ahead and r..1ake the change?
Perhaps, at the margin, there is a case so close to the line as to whether the bulk buyer
should comply or not with Article 6 that even the slightest change in law will produce a
slight change in behavior. See Carlson & Shupack, Part I, supra note 42, at 306-09 (cited
here with disapproval). At such a margin, however, the stakes are very small indeed, and
extremely marginal cases may not be worth the bother of scholarly activity worrying about
it. Also, the existence of the marginal cases is a pure article of faith. It could easily be true
that the marginal case has never arisen and will never arise-that the existing incentives
will overwhelm the new reformist incentives in every case.
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ent. He undertakes to list all the costs and benefits he can think of.
Here is a list of his findings:
Costs to Secured Party: Harris lists a series of costs to the
unperfected secured party, many of them alternatives to higher
costs elsewhere. 304 These items therefore significantly overlap:
1. The cost of perfecting a security interest, including the
cost of filing and the cost of ascertaining the debtor's correct
name and address. 305
2. The cost of monitoring the debtor to discover changes
in name or location of collateral. This cost is necessary to
keep the security interest perfected.
3. As an alternative to the costs of perfection, the secured
party can monitor the debtor to see if any bulk sales are
planned. If this monitoring reveals an impending bulk sale,
the secured party can destroy the buyer's seniority under
UCC section 9-301(1)(c) by telling the buyer about the unperfected security interest.
4. As an alternative to perfecting the security interest or
to monitoring the debtor to see if bulk sales are contemplated,
the secured party could simply raise the price of the loan in
order to compensate for the risk of loss absorbed.

Costs to the Complying Buyer: Harris also lists costs to the
bulk buyer and treats these costs as if the buyer bears them. 306 It
should be emphasized, however, that any such cost, if anticipated,
decreases the buyer's demand for another's inventory. That is, the
buyer reduces the price she is willing to pay, and the seller bears
all these costs. Therefore, the following list combines the cost
borne by the buyer and seller, on the theory that ultimately, the
seller bears all of the cost. Here is a list of those ·costs:
1. Determining that Article 6 applies.

2. Preparing and distributing the required notice.
304. Harris, supra note 1, at 212-15.
305. One thing that Harris leaves out is the cost of learning the law, so that the secured party knows enough to file at all. For most secured parties, this cost has already been
capitalized through legal education. For a new entrant into business, this cost might be
quite high.
306. Harris, supra note 1, at 214-15.
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· 3. The cost of tipping one's hand that one is buying inventory. These costs include competitive losses from the lack
of surprise.
4. As an alternative to complying with Article 6, the
buyer could search specifically for unrecorded security interests. If the seller refuses to disclose, or the buyer does not
trust the seller, this cost could be high.
5. The loss by the seller of creditor good will, once it is
learned that a bulk sale of inventory is contemplated.
6. In those states where the buyer must retain the proceeds for the benefit of creditors, ascertaining who the
creditors are and how much they deserve is a cost.
7. As an alternative to complying with Article 6, the bulk
buyer could keep the sales price in escrow until the six-nionth
statute of limitations runs out. 307
This seems like a pretty good list of the costs that would arise in a
universe that included only the buyer and the unperfected secured
party. It leaves out, however, the effect of prices in other markets
if the price in a specific market is raised or lowered (second-best
phenomena). It also is not clear that these costs are marginal costs.
In particular, one must wonder whether bulk sale costs are typically recurring costs of a retail business, such that inventory
acquisition is routinely affected by them. If the costs are one-shot
costs imposed upon a seller, then bearing high costs of this sort
may be too unpredictable to be included in a (short-term) marginal
cost curve. Such costs are typically incurred only when a business
shuts down. They are exit costs and may in fact have been capitalized (or ignored) at the beginning of the life of the enterprise.
In any case, even on the basis of the disclosed list, .Harris has
the sense to proclaim, "it is difficult to determine which class of
parties is able to avoid the loss at less cost." 308 This is law-andeconomics brought to its most brilliant possible manifestation. 309
307. This would not seem to help out against an unperfected security interest, which is
subject to no statute of limitations whatsoever. Hence, this may not be an effective observation. Harris sees that the escrow option is not really viable against an unperfected secured
party who is senior to the noncomplying buyer. Id. at 218-19.
308. Id. at 216.
309. After reaching this admirable conclusion, Harris regrettably backslides into some
confusion. He goes on to note that some losses are inevitable and that these losses should be
imposed on the party that would lose the least. Id. at 217. Now the problem with this asser-
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CONCLUSION

One would think that the priority between buyers (in bulk or
otherwise) and secured parties would be clear and straightforward.
Nothing is further from the case. In fact, the deep theory of priority turns out not to be very well worked out at all. I have tried to
illuminate a few of the tricks and difficulties. Most of these were
br~lliantly explored earlier by Professor Harris. If I have gone at
least a little beyond his work, I feel as if I have accomplished
something-proving once and for all that there is no such thing as
an easy case in commercial law. Even the simple cases are founded
on dark and misunderstood premises that come to the surface
when two ignorant armies of law-here, bulk sales and Article 9
security interests-clash by night.

tion is that one person's loss is another person's gain. Thus, if the secured party loses, the
noncomplying buyer gains, and vice versa. Harris would like to claim that these amounts are
not symmetrical. Id. I do not think he has shown this.
For asymmetry, Harris relies on the fact that the noncomplying buyer will lose the
retail or wholesale value of the inventory, while the secured party would gain only the liquidation value. Id. at 218. This overlooks the point that the secured party sells to somebody
who then gets the wholesale or retail value. Thus, if we followed Harris's advice and imposed a loss on the secured party, this would also impose a loss on the secured party's buyer
as well. These two losses should precisely equal the gain of retail or wholesale value of the
noncomplying buyer. Because Harris has forgotten that the secured party gets liquidation
value by selling the inventory to someone who resells (just like the noncomplying buyer) he
is able to produce the illusion of asymmetry. If there is asymmetry, it has to be based on the
premise that the secured party is less likely to channel the inventory to an eventual highest
valuing user than is the noncomplying buyer. But since, in either case, the goods will move
in roughly the same kind of distribution channels, such asymmetry is unlikely to be
demonstrable.
After incorrectly locating the smaller loss on the secured party, Harris then backslides
again, by suggesting that the size of the loss will affect compliance with the UCC. That is, if
the loss is imposed on the secured party, it is more likely that the secured party will comply
with Article 9 filing requirements. And .if the loss is imposed on the noncomplying buyer,
that buyer will more likely comply with the provisions of Article 6. This violates Harris's
own premise of loss allocation-that these losses are the ones that are too expensive to
prevent. But if they can be prevented by complying with the rules of the UCC, then they
are not unpreventable losses. Therefore, Harris contradicts his own presuppositions.

